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Abstract 
 
Three Essays on International Trade: 
Strategic Trade Policies, Intra-Industry Trade, and  
Income Convergence 
 
Aziz İbrahim Sağlam 
 
This dissertation illustrates the effects of managerial delegation on 
strategic trade policies and the relationship between intra-industry trade and 
income convergence. In the first essay strategic trade policy under duopoly is 
investigated in a multistage game model with endogenous timing of trade policy. 
The analysis also includes the separation of ownership and management for each 
firm. The study is integrated in a single analytical framework. The results show 
that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game, the home 
government commits not to use countervailing duties: the home government sets 
its tariff and production subsidy at stage one and the foreign government sets its 
export subsidy at stage two. As a result both countries are better off when the 
home government is the Stackelberg leader. The second paper analyzes the 
relationship between international trade and income convergence among 
countries by focusing on groups of countries comprising major trade partners. 
For each country, primary intra-industry trade partners are determined and trade 
groups are created. The behavior of income differentials within these groups is 
examined. The majority of these intra-industry trade-based groups exhibit 
significant income convergence. The third paper provides recent evidence on 
determinants of the bilateral intra-industry trade in a multi-country & multi-
industry framework. The empirical results show that the extent of intra-industry 
trade is positively correlated with average GNP, average GNP/capita, and the 
existence of a common border; and it is negatively correlated with difference in 
GNP, difference in GNP/capita, and distance. All the variables are highly 
significant statistically. The EU and NAFTA dummy variables have the expected 
positive sign and are highly significant statistically. The regression coefficients 
of the language dummy variables have a positive sign, but their level of statistical 
significance varies. 
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Chapter 1.   General Overview of the Dissertation 
The assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition are often violated in the real 
world. Traditional trade theory based on perfect competition does not effectively explain 
phenomena such as intra-industry trade and the high volume of trade between similar countries. 
Moreover, such models failed to successfully integrate some important policy related 
considerations, such as increasing returns to scale, learning-by-doing, R&D, and inter-firm 
strategic rivalries. Effective analysis of these topics requires imperfect competition, which 
together with increasing returns to scale is one of the main characteristics of many of today’s 
industries, especially of those in the industrialized countries. As new theories of imperfectly 
competitive markets have developed, game-theoretic approach of strategic trade policy began to 
emerge in the early 1980’s. 
 
As a strategic trade policy instrument, an export subsidy used by the foreign government 
could be “countervailed” by a domestic import tariff. The interesting point about these 
countervailing effects is that they do not eliminate incentives to use active strategic trade policy, 
and the policy equilibrium normally implies positive subsidies and tariffs. Collie (1994) examines 
a country’s optimal response to foreign export subsides. In his model, the home government uses 
an import tariff to extract rents from the foreign firm and a production subsidy to correct the 
domestic distortion due to imperfect competition. The foreign government uses an export subsidy 
to shift profits from the home firm to the foreign firm. He shows that the unique equilibrium 
sequence of moves of the governments is that the home government announces its trade policy 
before the foreign government does. 
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It may be of a particular interest to integrate the strategic trade policy with the 
hierarchical games in firm theory. It is generally argued that a proper analysis of the firm’s 
objective function should be based on the analysis of the owner-manager relationship. A 
manager’s objective depends on the structure of the incentives that his owner sets to motivate 
him. Owners often index managerial compensation to profits, sales, output, quality, and some 
other variables. Even if the owners want to maximize profits, the incentive system they design 
may imply managerial incentives which are different from profit maximization. 
 
Sklivas (1987) addresses the question of whether firms with separate owners and 
managers maximize profits. He examines an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or 
prices, as in the Cournot or Bertrand models, and owners choose their managers’ incentives. 
Owner evaluates his manager’s performance according to a measure, which is a linear 
combination of his firm’s profits and revenues. The higher is this measure, the higher is the 
manager’s payment. When managers compete in quantities, firms in the owner-manager game 
produce outputs greater than the output in the standard1 Cournot model. This results in firms’ 
having lower profits than the profit-maximizing firms in the standard Cournot model. When 
managers compete in prices, firms receive higher profits than in the standard Bertrand model. 
 
In what follows, Chapter 2 is concerned with strategic managerial delegation and its 
implications for international trade policy. Corporate firms, with separation of management and 
ownership, compete in international markets. We ask how trade policy affects the incentive to 
managers, which in turn affects the impact of trade policy on prices and quantities. This chapter 
combines the models of Collie (1994) and Sklivas (1987) in a single integrated analytical 
framework. The integrated model will have a modest contribution to the literature by   
                                                 
 
1 In the standard Cournot or Bertrand model, ownership and management are not separated for each firm. 
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investigating the strategic trade policies under duopoly in a multistage game with endogenous 
timing of trade policy when the ownership and the management are separated for each firm.  
 
Trade policy is modeled as a multi-stage game and the timing of trade policy decisions is 
endogenous. At the beginning of the game, stage zero, home and foreign governments 
independently and simultaneously choose whether to set trade policy at stage one or at stage two. 
Then, at the chosen stage, each government sets its trade policy to maximize its national welfare. 
The home government uses an import tariff to shift rent from the foreign firm and a production 
subsidy to correct the domestic distortion due to imperfect competition. The foreign government 
uses an export subsidy to shift profits from the home firm to the foreign firm. If, at stage zero, 
both governments choose to set trade policy at the same stage of the game, then the outcome will 
be a simultaneous-move trade policy game. If the home [foreign] government chooses to move at 
stage one and the foreign [home] government chooses to move at stage two, then the outcome 
will be a Stackelberg game where the home [foreign] government is the Stackelberg leader. At 
stage three the owners will simultaneously write and announce contracts with their managers that 
specify how they will be rewarded. Finally, the managers will simultaneously choose their firms’ 
outputs. The appropriate solution for this multistage game is the subgame perfect equilibrium, 
which is obtained by applying the Nash equilibrium to all the stages of the game by the process of 
backward induction.  
 
The results show that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game, the 
home government sets its tariff and production subsidy at stage one and the foreign government 
sets its export subsidy at stage two. By setting trade policy at stage one the home government 
commits itself to a lower tariff and production subsidy than in the Nash equilibrium of the 
simultaneous-move game, and this encourages the foreign government to use a larger export  
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subsidy than in the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game. As a result both countries 
are better off when the home government is the Stackelberg leader than in the simultaneous-move 
game. The home country benefits from a larger foreign export subsidy, and the foreign country 
gains from facing a lower tariff and production subsidy. The conclusion for trade policy is that 
imperfect competition does not provide an economic rationale for countervailing duties since the 
home country should commit not to use countervailing duties. When compared to those of Collie 
(1994), our results show that home and foreign welfares are higher, when the ownership and the 
management are separated for each firm. 
 
Chapter 3 of the dissertation is about the convergence of economic growth which is one 
of the most important issues in modern economics. In a world in which countries exchange 
goods, factors, and ideas; international linkages are what drive any convergence process. Though 
there is evidence of income convergence among some of the wealthy countries (Baumol, 1986; 
Baumol et al., 1989), it is not obvious why some subsets of these countries exhibit greater 
convergence than others, while other subsets of countries display no convergence tendencies at 
all. This chapter analyzes this issue from the perspective of trade’s contribution to the process. It 
examines the relationship between international trade and income convergence among countries 
by focusing on groups of countries forming major trade partners.  
 
In analyzing the factors that determine the extent of intra-industry trade in an inter-
country context, Linder (1961) advanced the hypothesis that the extent of trade in differentiated 
products will be the greater, the more similar are income levels among the trading countries. This 
hypothesis reflects the assumption that similarities in income levels are associated with 
similarities in demand structures. The results of Chapter 3 are not sufficient to differentiate 
between the hypothesis that countries that trade a great deal with one another tend to converge,  
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and the alternative hypothesis that similar countries tend to trade more. However, an analysis of 
the relationship between trade liberalization and income convergence (Ben-David, 1993, 1994a) 
suggests that it is trade liberalization that produces income convergence, rather than the other way 
around. Although no intra-group income convergence was evident before the trade reforms, 
significant convergence, together with significant increases in the volume of trade, began to occur 
simultaneously with the removal of the trade barriers. These findings provide evidence that it is 
the removal of obstacles to trade which leads to income convergence, rather than just the 
similarity suggested by the Linder hypothesis.  
 
There is an extensive literature about the extent of income convergence among countries. 
This literature, however, is mostly based on models that determine the existence and magnitude 
of convergence through the common cross-country growth regressions. The primary methodology 
used to test for the existence of convergence in these studies was to regress growth rates on initial 
levels of income plus the additional factors that one wished to control for. A negative relationship 
between the rates of growth and the initial incomes was interpreted as implying convergence. In 
Chapter 3, however, convergence will be characterized by the reduction in income differentials 
within specific groups of countries over time.  
 
Another difference between this research and the earlier papers is that the primary focus 
here is on intra-industry trade’s relationship to the convergence process. Trade groups are formed 
on the basis of intra-industry trade among countries rather than only exports or imports. No 
attempt is made to analyze and extend the theoretical motivations behind the relationship between 
intra-industry trade and income convergence. The contribution of this research is by empirically 
noting the existence of such a link. 
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The 1971-2002 income and trade data of 24 developed countries are included in the 
analysis with per capita incomes of $10,000 or higher in 2002. For each country, primary intra- 
industry trade partners are determined and trade groups are created. The behavior of income 
differentials within these groups is examined. The majority of these intra-industry trade-based 
groups exhibited significant income convergence. The hypotheses are tested to examine whether 
any random grouping of these same countries might produce similar results, whether the 
convergence within groups might be towards one country that is common to most of the groups, 
and whether the tendency towards convergence is considerably stronger when the basis for 
constructing groups is trade rather than proximity or common language.   
 
The results show that significant income convergence is not a common outcome among 
countries when they are grouped randomly instead of grouping them according to their trade 
partners; the convergence within groups is not towards one country that is common to most of the 
groups, but is instead an outcome that tends to be relatively robust to the exclusion of the major 
trade partners that are members in most of the groups, and the tendency towards convergence 
appears to be considerably stronger when the basis for constructing groups is trade rather than 
proximity or common language. 
 
Chapter 4 of the dissertation relates to the determinants of the intra-industry trade in a 
multi-country & multi-industry framework. One group of models that has emerged through the 
synthesis of international economics and industrial organization includes the models of intra-
industry trade. Intra-industry trade models provide an explanation for the simultaneous export and 
import of fairly similar goods. In these models countries’ markets are characterized by imperfect 
competition involving differentiated products and increasing returns to scale. The opening of  
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trade results in a greater product variety and an increased competition with a consequent 
reduction in costs and prices. In their pioneering study which fundamentally changed the way 
economists view the causes of international trade, Grubel and Lloyd (1975) established the extent 
of intra-industry trade in different industrial nations, considered some measurement issues, and 
investigated possible causes and consequences of such trade. To point out this fundamental 
change, Helpman and Krugman (1989) refer to intra-industry trade as “one of the key empirical 
reasons for emphasizing the role of increasing returns and imperfect competition in the world 
economy” (Helpman and Krugman , 1989: p.133). 
 
Greenaway and Milner (1986) have surveyed the literature on the testing of hypotheses 
concerning intra-industry trade. They suggest that the hypotheses can be classified in three 
groups. The first group of studies identifies country-specific characteristics that influence the 
extent of intra-industry trade2. The empirical results show that the extent of intra-industry trade is 
positively correlated with country characteristics. The general consistency of the signs and the 
significance levels of the coefficients give support for the country-specific hypotheses. 
 
The second group of studies has emphasized industry-specific determinants of intra-
industry trade relating to scale economies, product differentiation, and imperfect competition3. 
Greenaway and Milner conclude that there are some systematic inter-industry characteristics of 
intra-industry trade, and varying degrees of support for the hypotheses, but country characteristics 
seem to be more important than industry characteristics in explaining intra-industry trade. 
 
                                                 
 
2 Loertscher and Wolter (1980), Havrylyshyn and Civan (1983), Balassa (1986), and Globerman and Dean 
(1990). 
3 Culem and Lundberg (1983), Greenaway and Milner (1984), Balassa (1986), Marvel and Ray (1987), Ray 
(1991), Hamilton and Kniest (1991), Lundberg (1992), and Clark (1993). 
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The final group of empirical studies analyzed policy-based hypotheses relating to tariffs, 
non-tariff barriers, and economic integration4. Greenaway and Milner conclude that there is no 
consistent empirical evidence that variations in intra-industry trade can be explained by policy 
interventions.  
 
A more recent study is Kim and Oh (2001). From the cross-sectional analysis using 1970-
1994 data, results are obtained that support the following three empirical hypotheses: The share 
of intra-industry trade will be large: (a) if the two economies are of similar size, (b) if the capital-
labor endowment ratio of both countries is similar, and (c) if the total size of the two economies is 
large. 
 
In the literature, one group of authors has concentrated on the measurement of intra-
industry trade. Another group has taken econometric approaches and attempted to test the theory 
of intra-industry trade with data on an observed country or a group of countries. This research 
belongs to the second group. This study provides recent evidence on determinants of the intra-
industry trade in a multi-country & multi-industry framework. Bilateral trade data of 1998-2002 
period at three-digit SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) industry groups are used 
for 24 developed countries. 
 
First, a theoretical summary of a two-country model based on product differentiation and 
economies of scale will be provided, following Helpman (1981) and Helpman and Krugman 
(1985). Then, using this model, the determinants of bilateral intra-industry trade are analyzed in 
the trade of each country with every other country in each industry category. Some hypotheses  
                                                 
 
4 Balassa (1986), Bergstrand (1983), Havrylyshyn and Civan (1983), Toh (1982), Caves (1981), and 
Loertscher and Wolter (1980). 
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that are tested in this study investigate the effect of the following country characteristics on the 
bilateral intra-industry trade: average per capita income, average country size, income and size 
difference, distance, common border, trade orientation, participation in economic integration 
systems and common language. 
 
Trade data of 2002 for 24 developed countries are included in the analysis with per capita 
incomes of $10, 000 or higher. In the order of decreasing per capita GNP, these countries are 
Luxembourg, Norway, USA, Switzerland, Japan, Denmark, Ireland, Iceland, United Kingdom, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Canada, Germany, Belgium, France, Australia, Italy, 
Israel, Spain, New Zealand, Portugal, and Greece. The investigation covers 44 three-digit 
industry groups which belong to Section 7 of the Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC) system. 
 
The hypotheses put forward in the theoretical literature in regard to common country 
characteristics are generally confirmed by the empirical results. Thus, the extent of intra-industry 
trade is positively correlated with average income levels, average country size, and the existence 
of common borders and it is negatively correlated with income inequality, inequality in country 
size, and distance. All the variables are highly significant. 
 
We also found that the extent of intra-industry trade and participation in the EU, and the 
NAFTA are positively correlated, with all the coefficients being highly significant in the relevant 
equations. Also, the language variables have the expected positive sign whenever they are 
statistically significant, which is the case in most instances. 
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Chapter 2.   Export Subsidies, Countervailing Tariffs and 
Managerial Incentives in Strategic Trade Policy Games  
 
1   Introduction  
International trade has grown rapidly in the last decades. Reductions in tariffs and improvements 
in communication have lowered the costs of importing goods produced in other countries. 
Moreover, new producers are emerging as developing countries industrialize. As a result, 
producers in developed countries are facing increased competition from foreign producers. As an 
example, for many years export promotion was a large issue in Japanese government policy. 
Government officials recognized that Japan needed to import to grow and develop, and it needed 
to generate exports to pay for those imports. Japan’s methods of promoting exports have taken 
two paths. The first was to develop world-class industries that can initially substitute for imports 
and then compete in international markets. The second was to provide incentives for firms to 
export. The 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of policies to restrain exports in certain 
industries. The great success of some Japanese export industries created a reaction in other 
countries. Under GATT guidelines, nations have been reluctant to raise tariffs or impose import 
quotas. Instead, they have tried to convincing the exporting country to “voluntarily” restrain 
exports of the offending product. In the 1980s, Japan was quite willing to carry out such export 
restraints. Among Japan’s exports to the Unites States, steel, color television sets, and 
automobiles all were subjects to such restraints at various times.  
 
While there are many reasons for the current challenges facing American-owned auto 
manufacturers, Japan’s trade policies and the impact of Japan’s sustained currency manipulation 
stand out among the primary causes. With the progressive lowering of tariffs and other barriers to  
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trade, exchange rates have taken on a larger component of competitive advantage. This subsidy 
has both facilitated the expansion of Japanese companies in the U.S. and succeeded in keeping 
American-built automobiles out of Japan. In 2004, the U.S.-Japan bilateral automotive trade 
deficit reached $44.2 billion, making it the largest sectoral trade deficit the United States 
maintains with any country. In 2004, automotive trade represented over two-thirds of the total 
U.S.-Japan deficit. 
 
The assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition are often violated in 
the real world. Traditional trade theory based on perfect competition does not effectively explain 
phenomena such as intra-industry trade and the high volume of trade between similar countries. 
Moreover, such models failed to successfully integrate some important policy related 
considerations, such as increasing returns to scale, learning-by-doing, R&D, and inter-firm 
strategic rivalries. Effective analysis of these topics requires imperfect competition, which 
together with increasing returns to scale is one of the main characteristics of many of today’s 
industries, especially of those in the industrialized countries. As new theories of imperfectly 
competitive markets have developed, game-theoretic approach of strategic trade policy began to 
emerge in the early 1980’s. 
 
As a strategic trade policy instrument, an export subsidy used by the foreign government 
could be “countervailed” by a domestic import tariff. The interesting point about these 
countervailing effects is that they do not eliminate incentives to use active strategic trade policy, 
and the policy equilibrium normally implies positive subsidies and tariffs. Collie (1994) examines 
a country’s optimal response to foreign export subsides. In his model, the home government uses 
an import tariff to extract rents from the foreign firm and a production subsidy to correct the  
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domestic distortion due to imperfect competition. The foreign government uses an export subsidy 
to shift profits from the home firm to the foreign firm. He shows that the unique equilibrium 
sequence of moves of the governments is that the home government announces its trade policy 
before the foreign government does. 
 
It may be of a particular interest to integrate the strategic trade policy with the 
hierarchical games in firm theory. Traditional economic theory considers firms as economic 
agents with the single objective of profit maximization. Some have criticized this as being 
simplistic, arguing that real firms may have a different goal. Several theories have suggested that 
large firms are more concerned with maximizing revenues or market shares rather than profits. 
Recent advances in international trade theory emphasize strategic behavior among firms of 
different countries and its implication for trade policy. With the separation of ownership, 
management, and workers various incentive structures exist within a modern corporation. In order 
to correctly assess the policy intervention in international trade, it is important to understand how 
trade policies affect intra-firm incentives and vice versa. 
 
It is generally argued that a proper analysis of the firm’s objective function should be 
based on the analysis of the owner-manager relationship. A manager’s objective depends on the 
structure of the incentives that his owner sets to motivate him. Owners often index managerial 
compensation to profits, sales, output, quality, and some other variables. Even if the owners want 
to maximize profits, the incentive system they design may imply managerial incentives which are 
different from profit maximization. The principal (firm owner) can distort the incentives of his 
agents (firm managers) in order to affect the outcome of the competition between his agent and 
competing agents. In general, the owner of a firm will adjust his managers’ incentives in such a 
way that it will cause rival agents to change their behavior in favor of that firm. 
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Sklivas (1987) addresses the question of whether firms with separate owners and 
managers maximize profits. He examines an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or 
prices, as in the Cournot or Bertrand models, and owners choose their managers’ incentives. 
Owner evaluates his manager’s performance according to a measure, which is a linear 
combination of his firm’s profits and revenues. The higher is this measure, the higher is the 
manager’s payment. When managers compete in quantities, firms in the owner-manager game 
produce outputs greater than the output in the standard5 Cournot model. This results in firms’ 
having lower profits than the profit-maximizing firms in the standard Cournot model. When 
managers compete in prices, firms receive higher profits than in the standard Bertrand model. 
 
One aspect of managerial incentives analyzed in the principal-agent literature is the 
strategic delegation of price and quantity fixing decisions. Strategic delegation refers to the 
design of an incentive payment scheme to the manager, independent of considerations like moral 
hazard or adverse selection. If a duopoly market consists of a profit-maximizing firm and a firm 
in the administration of a manager who is instructed to maximize sales, the second firm may earn 
higher profits even when both firms face the same cost function. Hence there is an incentive to set 
up a non-profit maximizing objective for the manager6. 
 
This paper is concerned with strategic managerial delegation and its implications for 
international trade policy. Corporate firms, with separation of management and ownership, 
compete in international markets. We ask how trade policy affects the incentive to managers, 
which in turn affects the impact of trade policy on prices and quantities. Our paper combines the 
models of Collie (1994) and Sklivas (1987) in a single integrated analytical framework. The  
                                                 
 
5 In the standard Cournot or Bertrand model, ownership and management are not separated for each firm. 
6 See Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), and Katz (1991). 
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integrated model will have a modest contribution to the literature by investigating the strategic 
trade policies under duopoly in a multistage game with endogenous timing of trade policy when 
the ownership and the management are separated for each firm.  
 
In what follows, trade policy is modeled as a multi-stage game and the timing of trade 
policy decisions is endogenous. At the beginning of the game, stage zero, home and foreign 
governments independently and simultaneously choose whether to set trade policy at stage one or 
at stage two. Then, at the chosen stage, each government sets its trade policy to maximize its 
national welfare. The home government uses an import tariff to shift rent from the foreign firm 
and a production subsidy to correct the domestic distortion due to imperfect competition. The 
foreign government uses an export subsidy to shift profits from the home firm to the foreign firm. 
If, at stage zero, both governments choose to set trade policy at the same stage of the game, then 
the outcome will be a simultaneous-move trade policy game. If the home [foreign] government 
chooses to move at stage one and the foreign [home] government chooses to move at stage two, 
then the outcome will be a Stackelberg game where the home [foreign] government is the 
Stackelberg leader. At stage three the owners will simultaneously write and announce contracts 
with their managers that specify how they will be rewarded. Finally, the managers will 
simultaneously choose their firms’ outputs. The appropriate solution for this multistage game is 
the subgame perfect equilibrium, which is obtained by applying the Nash equilibrium to all the 
stages of the game by the process of backward induction.  
 
The results show that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game, the 
home government sets its tariff and production subsidy at stage one and the foreign government 
sets its export subsidy at stage two. By setting trade policy at stage one the home government 
commits itself to a lower tariff and production subsidy than in the Nash equilibrium of the  
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simultaneous-move game, and this encourages the foreign government to use a larger export 
subsidy than in the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game. As a result both countries 
are better off when the home government is the Stackelberg leader than in the simultaneous-move 
game. The home country benefits from a larger foreign export subsidy, and the foreign country 
gains from facing a lower tariff and production subsidy. The conclusion for trade policy is that 
imperfect competition does not provide an economic rationale for countervailing duties since the 
home country should commit not to use countervailing duties. When compared to those of Collie 
(1994), our results show that home and foreign welfares are higher, home firm’s profits are lower, 
and foreign firm’s profits are higher in each of the three games, i.e. simultaneous-move trade 
policy game, Stackelberg game when the home government is the Stackelberg leader, and 
Stackelberg game when the foreign government is the Stackelberg leader. 
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2   Literature Review 
2.1   Imperfect Competition and International Trade: 
        Emergence of the Strategic Trade Policies 
 
The inclusion of models of imperfect competition into the international trade theory has been one 
of the most important developments in the economic theory during the 1980’s. Some of the 
principal research areas of this literature are as follows: 
 
First is the relation between trade policy and the market power of domestic firms. Many 
economists have noted that international trade reduces the market power of domestic firms, and 
argued that protection increases domestic market power. Bhagwati (1965) firstly and then 
Krishna (1984) comprehensively demonstrated that the effects of protection depend on the form it 
takes - specifically, quantitative restrictions such as import quotas create more domestic market 
power than tariffs. 
 
Second is the role of price discrimination and “dumping” in international markets. A 
duopoly model of dumping was developed by Brander (1981) and analyzed fully by Brander and 
Krugman (1983). In a perfectly symmetrical situation with the complete absence of comparative 
advantage, it is shown that if the transport costs are not too large and if the firms behave in a 
Cournot fashion, trade will nevertheless result, as long as price subtracted by transportation cost 
exceeds marginal cost. 
 
A third research area is the industry structure that is most open to analysis, which is the 
monopolistic competition. This has been analyzed in detail by Krugman (1979), Lancaster 
(1980), Helpman (1981), and many others. The particular importance of this analysis is the  
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difference it shows between intra-industry trade, based on product diversity and increasing 
returns to scale, and inter-industry trade, explained by the factor endowment considerations. 
 
Another research area attempts to explore the possibility that government action can 
serve a “strategic” role in giving domestic firms an advantage in oligopolistic competition by 
shifting oligopoly rents from foreign to domestic firms. The starting point of this debate was 
several papers by Brander and Spencer (1981, 1983, and 1985). One of the pioneering models of 
Brander and Spencer, which made the main contribution to the emergence of the literature on 
strategic trade policies, will be examined in the next subsection. 
 
The basic idea of strategic trade policy to shift rents has been criticized from many points 
of view7. First, the policy implications are highly sensitive to the changes in the specific 
assumptions of the model. Second, policymakers must consider general equilibrium effects 
because industries compete for scarce special factors within a country. Third, rent-shifting by 
governments will probably cause rent-seeking activities by private agents that are not generally 
consistent with the interests of the society. 
 
2.2   The Pioneering Brander and Spencer (1985) Model 
Perhaps the most robust finding in the analysis of strategic trade policy is that imperfect 
competition of the oligopoly type almost always creates clear incentives for government 
intervention - “...government intervention can raise national welfare by shifting oligopoly rents 
from foreign to domestic firms...(and therefore) government policies can serve the “strategic”  
 
                                                 
 
7 For a survey of these criticisms, see Helpman and Krugman (1989). 
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purpose of altering the subsequent incentives of firms, acting as a deterrent to foreign 
competitors” (Krugman, 1989: p.1201). 
 
The idea of profit shifting can be explained most easily with reference to the Brander-
Spencer (1985) model in which a domestic government decides in the first stage on a linear 
export subsidy and, in the second stage, a domestic firm and a foreign firm compete in quantities 
on a third market. In the absence of government intervention, the equilibrium in the Brander-
Spencer model corresponds to the Cournot (Nash) solution. Then one government decides to give 
an export subsidy to let its firm to produce the output that corresponds to the Stackelberg leader 
position. As a result the total amount of sales increases, the leading country’s total profit 
increases; meanwhile, the follower’s profit is reduced because the follower sells a lower amount 
than it would without the intervention. Even without intervention, each duopolist would have an 
incentive to take the position of a Stackelberg leader if its rival were satisfied to act as a follower, 
but moving from a Cournot equilibrium to a leadership position is not considered a “credible 
choice” for either firm. In the presence of government intervention, however, an expansion of the 
subsidized firm’s output is regarded as a credible choice by its rival because an expansion would 
be privately profitable even if the rival would not reduce its output. “A subsidy to the cost of 
producing extra output makes it in the firm’s interest to expand output, even taking the other 
firm’s output as given. Therefore the firm’s expansion of output is credible. The rival firm can 
best respond by contracting output” (Brander, 1986: p.28). 
 
The Brander-Spencer analysis of shifting rents has been criticized from many viewpoints. 
First is the dependence of trade policy recommendations on the nature of competition between 
firms, analyzed by Eaton and Grossman (1986). They show that the Brander-Spencer argument 
for export subsidies depends on the assumption of Cournot competition and that replacing the  
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Cournot with Bertrand assumption reverses the policy recommendation; for the home firm to 
increase its profits, the government has to impose not an export subsidy, but an export tax. 
 
Second, policy-makers must consider general equilibrium effects because industries 
compete for scarce special factors within a country. This objection has been presented by Dixit 
and Grossman (1984). In general equilibrium, an export industry can expand only by taking 
resources away from other domestic industries. So an export subsidy, while it lowers the marginal 
cost in the targeted industry, will raise marginal cost in other sectors. Thus, in industries that are 
not targeted the effect will be the reverse of deterrence. 
 
Third, the extent for raising national income through strategic trade policies is negligible. 
This argument, developed by Dixit (1984), rests on potential competition through entry. An 
industry in which firms earn profits will be attractive to new entrants and if entry actually takes 
place, increased competition will limit or eliminate the profits of the subsidizing country. 
 
Finally, the Brander-Spencer analysis assumes that the government can commit itself to a 
trade policy before firms make their decisions. They also do not consider the possible reactions of 
foreign governments. However, firms also make strategic moves to affect government decisions 
and governments must consider the possibility of foreign reactions. Many of these models have 
been analyzed by Dixit and Kyle (1985). 
 
2.3   Countervailing Tariffs: The model of Collie (1994) 
Much of the literature of strategic trade policy assumes the sequence of moves of rival 
governments as exogenously given. For example, Collie (1991) examines the optimal export 
subsidy set by a foreign government when a home government responds to a foreign export 
subsidy with a home import tariff. In his model, the foreign government is exogenously assigned  
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the role of a Stackelberg leader and the home government the role of a Stackelberg follower. He 
finds that the optimal domestic response to a foreign export subsidy is to retaliate with a partial 
countervailing tariff and the extent of countervailing is sufficient in most cases to eliminate the 
foreign country’s incentive to use an export subsidy. 
 
To correct the modeling problem of exogenously given sequence of moves of the 
governments, Collie (1994) extends his earlier work by allowing the timing of trade policy 
decisions to be endogenous. The home government uses an import tariff to extract rent from the 
foreign firm and a production subsidy to correct the domestic distortion due to imperfect 
competition. The foreign government uses an export subsidy to shift profits from the home firm 
to the foreign firm. The results of Collie (1994) show that the home government setting trade 
policy at stage one and the foreign government setting trade policy at stage two is the Nash 
equilibrium. Both countries are better off when the home government is the Stackelberg leader. 
An immediate conclusion is that imperfect competition cannot explain the existence of 
countervailing duties since the home government commits not to use them in equilibrium. 
 
2.4   The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives 
Economists have long considered the objective function of large corporations. Several theories 
argue that in the firms with separate owners and managers, the interests of managers - their 
income, status, power, security, etc. – lie partly with sales and growth rather than purely with 
profits. Agency theory, going back to Jensen and Meckling (1976), Holmstrom (1979), and many 
other related papers, suggests that, if the objective function of the manager is different from the 
objective function of the owner, one may observe behavior that deviates from profit 
maximization. For example, managers may have a strategy of diversification to increase their job 
security or to assure the long-run survival of the firm (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Donaldson and  
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Lorsch, 1983). Managers may want to secure their positions by choosing irreversible projects that 
require expertise owned by only the current management (Schleifer and Vishny, 1989). Kedia 
(2002) finds empirical support for the idea that top management compensation is related to sales 
maximization in an oligopoly setting. 
 
Fershtman and Judd (1987) model a case where owners who are interested in profit 
maximization may find it optimal to include sales maximization in the manager’s objective 
function in an oligopoly setting. The nature of the optimal incentive structure critically depends 
on the nature of oligopolistic competition. In the case of Cournot quantity competition, Fershtman 
and Judd (1987) prove that each owner wants to motivate his manager toward high production in 
order to get rival managers to reduce their output. Therefore, in equilibrium, owners will give a 
positive incentive for sales. On the other hand, if firms compete in price, each owner wants his 
manager to set a high price, encouraging rival managers to also raise their prices. Therefore, with 
price competition, owners will pay managers to keep sales low.  
 
Sklivas (1987) shows that the separation of ownership and management gives the owners 
the opportunity to commit their managers to non-profit-maximizing behavior. When managers 
compete in quantities, firms in the owner-manager game act as profit maximizers with less than 
true cost. They produce outputs greater than the Cournot output. This results in firms’ having 
lower profits than the profit-maximizing firms in the standard Cournot model. When managers 
compete in prices, the consequences of the separation of ownership and management reverse; 
firms act as profit maximizers with greater than true cost, with the result that prices are higher. 
Firms also receive higher profits than in the standard Bertrand model. 
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3   The Model 
 
There are two countries in the model: the home and the foreign country. Home country variables 
are denoted by the subscript 1 and foreign country variables by the subscript 2. The industry that 
is analyzed is a Cournot duopoly with one firm in each country, and the home and foreign 
markets are assumed to be segmented. Each firm has one owner and one manager. The home and 
foreign firms have constant marginal costs c1 and c2, respectively. With segmented markets and 
constant marginal cost, the home market can be analyzed independently of the foreign market. 
The home firm produces x1 for the home market and the foreign firm exports x2 to the home 
market, hence total sales in the home market are X = x1 + x2. Price in the home market is given by 
the linear inverse demand function P = a − bX. While the home government uses a specific 
import tariff of t per unit and a production subsidy of s per unit, the foreign government uses an 
export subsidy of e per unit. 
 
Trade policy is modeled as a multi-stage game and the timing of trade policy decisions is 
endogenous. At the beginning of the game, stage zero, home and foreign governments 
independently and simultaneously choose whether to set trade policy at stage one or at stage two. 
Once they have chosen when to set trade policy their decisions become common knowledge and 
they are committed to this timing of moves in the game. Then, at the chosen stage, each 
government sets its trade policy to maximize its national welfare. The home government uses an 
import tariff to shift rent from the foreign firm and a production subsidy to correct the domestic 
distortion due to imperfect competition. The foreign government uses an export subsidy to shift 
profits from the home firm to the foreign firm. If, at stage zero, both governments choose to set 
trade policy at the same stage of the game, then the outcome will be a simultaneous-move trade 
policy game. If the home [foreign] government chooses to move at stage one and the foreign  
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[home] government chooses to move at stage two, then the outcome will be a Stackelberg game 
where the home [foreign] government is the Stackelberg leader. At stage three the owners will 
simultaneously write and announce contracts with their managers that specify how they will be 
rewarded. Finally, the managers will simultaneously choose their firms’ outputs. The appropriate 
solution for this multistage game is the subgame perfect equilibrium, which is obtained by 
applying the Nash equilibrium to all the stages of the game by the process of backward induction. 
 
Owner i measures his manager’s performance according to some function of his firm’s 
profits (Πi) and revenues (Ri), which are observed indicators of performance. We call this 
measure gi, i = 1,2. The higher is gi, the higher is manager i’s bonus. Because firm i’s output, xi, 
does not enter manager i’s utility directly, the owner links the manager’s reward to xi (as well as 
to xj) through a function of gi. So, let Ai + Bi gi(.,.) represent manager i’s incentives, where Ai and 
Bi are nonnegative reals. For simplicity, we make gi a linear combination of profits and revenues: 
 
gi = λi Πi(x1, x2) + (1 - λi) Ri(x1, x2) 
    = Ri(x1, x2) - λi Ci(xi), i = 1, 2, where 
Ci(xi) = ci xi 
Π1(x1, x2) = (P - c1 + s) x1     Π2(x1, x2) = (P − c2 – t + e) x2 
R1(x1, x2) = (P + s) x1      R2(x1, x2) = (P – t + e) x2   
 
The owner i has full information about his manager’s costs and actions. The owner’s goal 
is simply to determine what action he wants the manager to choose, and to design an incentive 
payment to induce the manager to choose that action.  For the owner i’s choice of λi , let xi(λi,λ*j) 
denote the action that manager i can take, given owner j’s choice of λ*j and manager j’s choice of  
x*j. The problem, from the viewpoint of owner i, of determining λi and designing the optimal 
incentive scheme Ai + Bi gi(.,.) can be written as  
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ii B ,A, i
maxλ Πi ( (
*
1x iλ , *jλ ), (*2x iλ , *jλ )) – (Ai + Bi gi ( (*1x iλ , *jλ ), (*2x iλ , *jλ ))) 
such that   Ai + Bi  gi ( (*1x iλ , *jλ ), (*2x iλ , *jλ )) ≥ w0,i          (1) 
                  Ai + Bi  gi ( (*1x iλ , *jλ ), (*2x iλ , *jλ )) ≥ Ai+Bi gi ( (1x iλ , *jλ ), (*2x iλ , *jλ ))   (2) 
 
where w0,i  denotes the reservation wage of manager i. 
 
 Condition (1) imposes the constraint that each manager must receive at least his 
reservation wage since one possible “action” is not to participate; this is the participation 
constraint. To minimize the salary of his manager, as it is a loss term in the objective function of 
the owner, the owner i must  then equate it to the reservation wage w0,i . 
 
Condition (2) imposes the constraint that the manager i will find it optimal to 
choose (*ix iλ , *jλ ); this is the incentive compatibility constraint. As we are going to define in 
Section 3.1, *ix  that enters into the objective function of owner i is actually the argument that 
maximizes gi( ix ,
*
jx ). Therefore, for any positive real Bi  the incentive compatibility condition 
will always be satisfied. Thus, the owner i can choose Bi arbitrarily small, as long as it is positive. 
Then  Ai  can, in effect, be chosen to be arbitrarily close to wo,i   and the objective function of 
owner i will be arbitrarily close to  Πi ( (*1x iλ , *jλ ), (*2x iλ , *jλ )) – w0,i . Normalizing w0,i  to zero 
for simplicity, we will hereafter assume, as in Sklivas (1987), that the problem of owner i is to 
maximize Πi ( (*1x iλ , *jλ ), *2x ( iλ , *jλ )) over λi whereas the problem of manager i is to maximize 
gi( (ix iλ , *jλ ), *jx ( iλ , *jλ )) over xi. 
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3.1   Stage 3: Managers choose their firms’ outputs 
The firms simultaneously and independently choose their outputs to maximize gi given s, t, e, λ1, 
and λ2. 
 
Definition: ( *1x ,
*
2x ) is a Nash equilibrium in the managers’ subgame if and only if  
*
ix  = argmax gi( ix ,
*
jx ), i,j = 1,2, i≠ j.      
 
g1 = (P + s) x1  − λ1 c1 x1 
     = (a − b(x1 + x2) + s) x1 − λ1 c1 x1 
g2 = (P – t + e) x2 − λ2 c2 x2         
           = (a − b(x1 + x2) – t + e) x2 − λ2 c2 x2 
 
Assuming the home market is supplied by both home production and imports, the first-order 
conditions for a Cournot equilibrium are: 
1
1
x
g
∂
∂
 = a − b(x1 + x2) + s − bx1 - λ1 c1 = 0   (3)   
2
2
x
g
∂
∂
 = a − b(x1 + x2) - t + e – bx2 – λ2 c2 = 0   (4) 
 
Hence we find manager i’s best-response function, );( iji x λφ , by maximizing gi(.) over xi. As λi 
is decreased, costs are weighted less, and (.)iφ shifts out. So, decreasing λi commits manager i to 
more “aggressive” behavior, i.e. for every xj, manager i responds with a greater xi: 
 
);(
2 121
112
1 λφλ xb
csbxax =−+−=  
);(
2 212
221
2 λφλ xb
cetbxax =−+−−=  
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Solving Eqs. (3) and (4) simultaneously, we get the Nash equilibrium quantities and price as: 
 
 x1 = 1 1 2 2
2 21
3
a s c t e c
b
λ λ+ − + − +
 
b
cetcsax 22112
222
3
1 λλ −+−+−=    (5) 
 P = 
3
1
( 1 1 2 2a t s e c cλ λ+ − − + + ) 
 
Notice that as the owner i makes his manager more aggressive by decreasing λi, his own firm’s 
output increases, while his rival’s decrease in equilibrium. 
 
3.2   Stage 2: Owners choose their managers’ incentives8 
The owners will simultaneously write and announce contracts with their managers that specify 
how they will be rewarded. 
 
Definition: ( *1λ , *2λ ) is a Nash equilibrium in the owners’ subgame if and only if  
*
iλ  = argmax Πi ( (*1x iλ , *jλ ), (*2x iλ , *jλ )), i,j = 1,2, i≠ j. 
Π1(x1, x2) = (P - c1 + s) x1 
1λ∂
∂
Π1(x1, x2) = 0 
⇒ bx1 - 2(P - c1 + s) = 0       (6) 
 
 
Π2(x1, x2) = (P – c2 – t + e) x2 
2λ∂
∂
Π2(x1, x2) = 0  
⇒ bx2 - 2(P – c2 - t + e) = 0      (7) 
                                                 
 
8 To see some of the calculations in detail, see Appendix. 
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Using the Nash equilibrium quantities and price in (5) and solving Eqs. (6) and (7) 
simultaneously, we get *1λ  and *2λ as: 
 
1
12*
1
82223
5
1
c
ccetsa +−+−−−=λ  
2
12*
2
28332
5
1
c
ccetsa −+−++−=λ  
 
We show in the subsections 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3 that at the equilibrium we have 1*1 <λ  and 
1*2 <λ . Substituting *1λ  and *2λ  above into (5), we get  
 
b
ccetsax 121
32223
5
2 −+−++=  
b
ccetsax 122
23332
5
2 +−+−−=     (8) 
P c c t s e
a= + + − − +2
5 21 2
( )  
 
Why do firms choose at the equilibrium 1*1 <λ , 1*2 <λ  and not 1*1 =λ , 1*2 =λ ? To show 
this, let us assume, without loss of the generality, that 0=== ets . Now, if 11 =λ  and 12 =λ , 
then both firms will maximize their profits and the result will be a Cournot outcome. The first 
order conditions for this Cournot equilibrium will give: 
 
b
ccax 211
2
3
1 +−= ,  
b
ccax 212
2
3
1 −+= ,  )(
3
1
21 ccaP ++=  
b
cca 221
1
)2(
9
1 +−=Π , 
b
cca 221
2
)2(
9
1 −+=Π  
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Now, given the second firm sets 12 =λ  and maximizes its profits, it is a better strategy for firm 1 
to decrease its costs 1c  so that its output and profit increase. This follows from  
 
0
1
1 <
dc
dx
,  0
1
1 <Π
dc
d
. 
 
For firm 1 to decrease its costs, the owner lets his manager maximize a linear 
combination of profits and revenues. Then, in the objective function of the manager, the cost term 
is not 1c  any more, but it is 11cλ , i.e. 
g1 = R1(x1, x2) – λ1 c1 x1, where 11 <λ . 
 
But then, if the manager of firm 2 continues to operate with 2c  choosing 12 =λ , firm 1 would 
have a “cost advantage” and increase its profits while the profits of firm 2 would decrease. In 
other words, firm 1’s unilateral deviation from profit maximization increases its profits and 
lowers firm 2’s. So then, the best response of firm 2 is to “decrease” its costs by choosing 12 <λ , 
too. 
 
Thus, in the owner-manager game, managers behave more aggressively than profit 
maximizers, i.e. 1*1 <λ  and 1*2 <λ . This results in outputs that are higher than in the Cournot 
model, )1,1(),( **2
*
1
*
ii xx >λλ , i=1,2. Setting s=t=e=0 and ccc == 21 , from Eq.(5) and Eq.(8), we 
see that  
 
)1,1(
3
1
5
2),( *1
*
2
*
1
*
1 xb
ca
b
cax =−>−=λλ  
)1,1(
3
1
5
2),( *2
*
2
*
1
*
2 xb
ca
b
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The intuition for the result of the owners’ committing their managers to non-profit 
maximizing behavior can be also seen in Figure 1. Figure 1 illustrates the Cournot outcome, C; 
and the outcome of the owner-manager game, M. In choosing iλ , an owner implicitly chooses his 
manager’s best-response function, so we can think of owners as playing a game in best response 
functions. Starting from point C, the Nash equilibrium in the managers’ subgame resulting 
from 11 =λ  and 12 =λ , owner 1 can increase his profits by decreasing 1λ , which shifts 
)1;( 121 =λφ x  out to );( *1121 λλφ =x . By committing his manager to more aggressive behavior, 
owner 1 moves the equilibrium quantities down along )1;( 212 =λφ x  to point T, and so increases 
*
1x and decreases
*
2x . This increases owner 1’s profits
9.  
 
So, 11 =λ  cannot be a best response to 12 =λ  and point C, where both owners’ 
committing their managers to profit-maximizing behavior cannot be an equilibrium. But 
then, 12 =λ  is not a best response to *11 λλ =  either, since by decreasing 2λ  and shifting 
)1;( 212 =λφ x  out to );( *2212 λλφ =x , owner 2 can increase his profits. So, point T is not an 
equilibrium, either. One can see that *1λ  is a best response to *2λ  by the fact that firm 1’s isoprofit 
curve is tangent to );( *2212 λλφ =x at M, and similarly that *2λ  is a best response to *1λ  by the fact 
that firm 2’s isoprofit curve is tangent to );( *1121 λλφ =x at M. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
9 Note that profits increase as the isoprofit curves approach to the origin; since, for example, for a fixed 
1x value, if we decrease 2x - that is, if we go down and approach to 1x axis – the price will increase, since 
P = a – b(x1 + x2) and thus the profits of the firm 1 will increase. 
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3.3   Stage 1: Governments choose their trade policies10 
Each government sets its trade policy to maximize its national welfare. The welfare of the home 
country is given by the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and government revenue. 
Hence, home welfare is: 
W1 = ∫
+
−++−++−−
8
2
8
1
0
*
1
*
2
*
1
*
11
*
2
*
1 )()()(
xx
sxtxsxxcPxxPdQbQa  
             ↑ ---------------CS-------------↑  ↑ -------PS------↑   ↑ -GR-↑  
 
CS: Consumer Surplus, PS: Producer Surplus, GR: Government Revenue 
⇒ *2*11*2*12*2*11 ))(()(2 txxcxxbaxx
bW +−+−++=      (9) 
The welfare of the foreign country is the profits of the foreign firm from exports less the export 
subsidy payments. Hence, foreign welfare is: 
 
W2 = *1
*
1
*
22 )( exexxtcP −+−−  
           ↑ -------- Π2-------↑ ↑ ESP↑    
 
Π2: Profits of the foreign firm, ESP: Export subsidy payments 
⇒ *22*2*12 ))(( xtcxxbaW −−+−=           (10) 
 
To analyze stage zero of the game there are three possible outcomes to consider: the Nash 
equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game; the Nash equilibrium of the Stackelberg game when 
the foreign government is the first mover; and the Nash equilibrium of the Stackelberg game 
when the home government is the first mover. 
 
 
                                                 
 
10 To see some of the calculations in detail, see Appendix. 
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3.3.1   Simultaneous-Move Trade Policy Game 
If, at stage zero, both governments choose to set trade policy at the same stage of the game, then 
the outcome will be a simultaneous-move trade policy game. Both governments simultaneously 
and independently choose their trade policy to maximize national welfares in (9) and (10). It will 
be assumed that there is an interior solution where the market is supplied by both home 
production and imports11. Differentiating (9) and (10) we get 
 
01 =∂
∂
t
W
 ⇒  0562)(4)(2 *2*11*2*1 =+−+−++− bxtbxcPxxb    (11) 
01 =∂
∂
s
W
 ⇒  02)(3)( *11*2*1 =−−−++ tbxcPxxb       (12) 
02 =∂
∂
e
W
 ⇒  0)(3 *22 =−−− bxtcP          (13) 
 
Solving Eqs. (11), (12), and (13) simultaneously and using (8) we get 
 
1 1 2
1 (5 11 6 )
5
sx a c c
b
= − +  
2 1 2
6 ( )
5
sx c c
b
= −  
1
sP c=  
1 2
1 (5 11 6 )
10
ss a c c= − +  
1 2
3 ( )
5
st c c= −  
1 2
1 ( )
5
se c c= − , 
 
                                                 
 
11 This assumption will be valid if the foreign firm has a cost advantage, but not such a large cost 
advantage that home production is not worthwhile. 
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where the superscript S denotes the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move trade policy 
game. Substituting the above into the formulas of λ1, λ2, Π1, Π2, W1, and W2 we get: 
1 2
1
1
5 21 61
10
a c c
c
λ − + −= <112 
1 2
2
2
3 81
5
c c
c
λ −= − <1 
Π1 21 2
1 (5 11 6 )
50
a c c
b
= − +  
Π2 21 2
18 ( )
25
c c
b
= −  
sW1
2 2
1 1 2
1 18( ) ( )
2 25
a c c c
b b
= − + −  
sW2
2
1 2
12 ( )
25
c c
b
= −  
 
The results of Collie (1994) model and our model in the simultaneous-move trade policy 
game are compared in Table 1 in the Appendix. In the Nash equilibrium, the home government 
uses a positive tariff and production subsidy, and the foreign government uses a positive export 
subsidy. Price in the home market is equal to the marginal cost of the home firm, and the home 
tariff is three times as large as the foreign export subsidy. In what follows, the variables of the 
Collie (1994) model are denoted by the superscript C. Our results show that W1 ≥ CW1 , W2 ≥ 
CW2 , 
i.e. home and foreign welfares are higher; Π1 ≤ Π C1 , Π2 ≥  Π C2 , i.e. home firm’s profits are lower 
and foreign firm’s profits are higher; x1 ≤ x C1 , x2 ≥ x
C
2 , i.e. home firm’s output is lower and 
foreign firm’s exports are higher; and s ≤ sC, t ≤ tC, e ≤ eC, i.e. home government’s production 
subsidy, import tariff, and foreign government’s export subsidy are lower. 
 
                                                 
 
12 To see why λ1 and λ2 are less than 1, see the Appendix.  
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3.3.2   Stackelberg Game when the Foreign Government is the First Mover 
If, at stage zero of the game, the foreign government decides to set its export subsidy at stage one 
and the home government decides to set its tariff and production subsidy at stage two, then the 
outcome will be a Stackelberg game with the foreign government as the Stackelberg leader. The 
subgame perfect equilibrium is obtained by first solving stage two for the optimal tariff and 
production subsidy of the home government as a function of of the foreign export subsidy set at 
stage one, and then using this solution to obtain the optimal foreign export subsidy. At stage two, 
the home government sets its tariff and production subsidy to maximize home welfare (9) given 
the foreign export subsidy. Assuming there is an interior solution, the first-order conditions for 
welfare maximization are: 
 
01 =∂
∂
t
W
 ⇒  0562)(4)(2 *2*11*2*1 =+−+−++− bxtbxcPxxb    (14) 
01 =∂
∂
s
W
 ⇒  02)(3)( *11*2*1 =−−−++ tbxcPxxb       (15)  
 
Solving Eqs. (14) and (15) simultaneously and using (8) we get 
1 1 2
1 ( 2 )x a e c c
b
= − − +  
2 1 2
1 ( )x e c c
b
= + −  
1P c=                  (16)    
1 2
1 ( )
2
t e c c= + −  
1 2
1 ( 2 )
2
s a e c c= − − +  
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At stage one the foreign government sets its export subsidy to maximize its national welfare, 
realizing that its export subsidy will affect the optimal tariff and production subsidy set by the 
home government at stage two. Using (16), we get  
 
W2 2 21 2
1 (( ) )
2
c c e
b
= − −  
02 =∂
∂
e
W
 ⇒  eF = 0,          (17)  
 
where the superscript F denotes the subgame perfect equilibrium of the Stackelberg game when 
the foreign government is the first mover. Substituting (17) into (16) gives 
1 1 2
1 ( 2 )Fx a c c
b
= − +  
2 1 2
1 ( )Fx c c
b
= −  
1
FP c=  
1 2
1 ( )
2
Ft c c= −  
1 2
1 ( 2 )
2
Fs a c c= − +  
 
Substituting the above into the formulas of λ1, λ2, Π1, Π2, W1, and W2 we get: 
1 2
1
1
41
2
a c c
c
λ − + −= <113   1 22
2
31
2
c c
c
λ −= − <1 
Π1 21 2
1 ( 2 )
2
a c c
b
= − +     Π2 21 21 ( )2 c cb= −  
=FW1 2 21 1 21 1( ) ( )2 2a c c cb b− + −  
FW2
2
1 2
1 ( )
2
c c
b
= −  
 
 
                                                 
 
13 To see why λ1 and λ2 are less than 1, see the Appendix. 
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The results of Collie (1994) model and our model in the Stackelberg game when the foreign 
government is the first mover are compared in Table 2 in the Appendix. When the foreign 
government is the Stackelberg leader, the foreign government sets a zero export subsidy at stage 
one because it realizes that the home government will retaliate with a countervailing duty at the 
second stage, and as a result the home tariff is lower than in the simultaneous-move game. Price 
in the home market is equal to the marginal cost of the home firm. When compared to those of 
Collie (1994), our results show that W1 ≥ CW1 , W2 ≥ 
CW2 , i.e. home and foreign welfares are 
higher; Π1 ≤ Π C1 , Π2  ≥  Π C2 , i.e. home firm’s profits are lower and foreign firm’s profits are 
higher; x2 ≥ x C2 , i.e. foreign firm’s exports are higher; x1 ≤ x
C
1 , i.e. home firm’s output is lower if 
3c1 − 2c2 ≥ a; and s ≤ sC, t = tC, e = eC, i.e. home government’s production subsidy is lower, home 
government’s import tariff and foreign government’s export subsidy are equal to those in the 
Collie (1994) model. 
 
3.3.3   Stackelberg Game when the Home Government is the First Mover 
If, at stage zero of the game, the home government decides to set its tariff and production subsidy 
at stage one and the foreign government decides to set its export subsidy at stage two, then the 
outcome will be a Stackelberg game with the home government as the Stackelberg leader. The 
subgame perfect equilibrium is obtained by first solving stage two for the optimal export subsidy 
of the foreign government as a function of the home tariff and production subsidy set at stage one, 
and then using this solution to obtain the optimal home tariff and production subsidy. At stage 
two, the foreign government sets its export subsidy to maximize foreign welfare (8) given the 
home tariff and production subsidy. Assuming there is an interior solution, the first-order 
condition for welfare maximization is: 
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e
W
∂
∂ 2  = 0 ⇒  0)(3 *22 =−−− bxtcP          (18) 
Solving Eq. (18) and using (8), we get 
 
x1 = - 1 2
4 3 4 31
3
a s t c c
b
− − − + −
 
 
x2 = 1 1 2
2 3 2 31
2
a s t c c
b
λ− − + −
       
                  (19) 
P = 
6
1
1 2( 2 3 2 3 )a s t c c− + + +  
 
e = 
12
1
1 2( 2 3 2 3 )a s t c c− − + −  
 
 
At stage one the home government sets its tariff and production subsidy to maximize its national 
welfare, realizing that its tariff and production subsidy will affect the optimal export subsidy set 
by the foreign government at stage two. Using (19), we get  
 
22
21
2
221
2
11 28302829652458468(72
1 satasaacaccccc
b
W −+++−−+−=             
                        )181263124060 21
2
21 tctctscscst −−−+−−            
 
 
Solving 
s
W
∂
∂ 1  = 
t
W
∂
∂ 1  = 0 we find 
1 2
1 5 3( )
2 2 2
Hs a c c= − +  
                   (20) 
1 2
1 ( )
2
Ht c c= −  
 
where the superscript H denotes the subgame perfect equilibrium of the Stackelberg game when 
the home government is the first mover. Substituting (20) into (19) gives 
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1 1 2
1 (2 5 3 )
2
Hx a c c
b
= − +  
2 1 2
3 ( )
2
Hx c c
b
= −  
1
HP c=  
1 2
1 ( )
4
He c c= −  
 
Substituting the above into the formulas of λ1, λ2, Π1, Π2, W1, and W2 we get: 
 
1 2
1
1
2 9 31
4
a c c
c
λ − + −= <114 
1 2
2
2
3 71
4
c c
c
λ −= − <1 
Π1 21 2
1 (2 5 3 )
8
a c c
b
= − +  
Π2 21 2
9 ( )
8
c c
b
= −  
=HW1 2 21 1 21 3( ) ( )2 4a c c cb b− + −  
HW2
2
1 2
3 ( )
4
c c
b
= −  
 
The results of Collie (1994) model and our model in the Stackelberg game when the home 
government is the first mover are compared in Table 3 in the Appendix. When the home 
government is the Stackelberg leader, it is found to commit to a lower tariff and production 
subsidy than in the simultaneous-move game, and this encourages the foreign government to use 
a larger export subsidy. Price in the home market is equal to the marginal cost of the home firm. 
When compared to those of Collie (1994), our results show that W1 ≥ CW1 , W2 ≥ 
CW2 , i.e. home  
                                                 
 
14 To see why λ1 and λ2 are less than 1, see the Appendix. 
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and foreign welfares are higher; Π1 ≤ Π C1 , Π2 ≥ Π
C
2 , i.e. home firm’s profits are lower and 
foreign firm’s profits are higher; x1 ≤ x C1 , x2 ≥ x
C
2 , i.e. home firm’s output is lower and foreign 
firm’s exports are higher; and s ≤ sC, t = tC, e ≤ eC, i.e. home government’s production subsidy 
and foreign government’s export subsidy are lower whereas home government’s import tariff is 
equal to that in the Collie (1994) model. 
 
3.3.4   The Timing of Trade Policy Decisions 
At stage zero the two governments each independently and simultaneously choose whether to set 
trade policy at stage one or at stage two. If both governments choose to set trade policy at the 
same stage of the game, then the outcome will be the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move 
game. If the home government sets trade policy at stage one and the foreign government sets 
trade policy at stage two, then the outcome is the subgame perfect equilibrium of the Stackelberg 
game when the home government is the Stackelberg leader. If the foreign government sets trade 
policy at stage one and the home government sets trade policy at stage two, then the outcome is 
the subgame perfect equilibrium of the Stackelberg game when the foreign government is the 
Stackelberg leader. The payoff matrix for this game of timing is given in Table 4 in the 
Appendix. The following proposition builds up on the result of Collie (1994). Collie had shown 
that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game, the home government sets its 
tariff and production subsidy at stage one and the foreign government sets its export subsidy at 
stage two. In his paper, however, the ownership and management were not separated for each 
firm and thus, the firms were just maximizing their profits. 
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Proposition 1: When the ownership and the management are separated for each firm, in the 
subgame perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game, the home government sets its tariff and 
production subsidy at stage one and the foreign government sets its export subsidy at stage two.  
 
Proof: The comparison of home welfares when the home government sets trade policy at stage 
one with when it sets trade policy at stage two yields: 
 
SW1 - 
FW1 = 
2 2
1 1 2
1 18( ) ( )
2 25
a c c c
b b
− + −  - 2 21 1 21 1( ( ) ( ) )2 2a c c cb b− + −  
             = 21 2
11 ( ) 0
50
c c
b
− ≥  
 
HW1 - 
SW1 = 
2 2
1 1 2
1 3( ) ( )
2 4
a c c c
b b
− + −  - ( 2 21 1 21 18( ) ( )2 25a c c cb b− + − ) 
              = 21 2
3 ( ) 0
100
c c
b
− ≥  
 
Whatever stage the foreign government sets its trade policy, home welfare is always higher if the 
home government sets its trade policy at stage one rather than at stage two. Therefore, setting 
trade policy at stage one is a dominant strategy for the home government, and hence it will 
obviously set trade policy at stage one. 
 
The comparison of foreign welfares when the foreign government sets trade policy at 
stage one with when it sets trade policy at stage two yields: 
 
SW2 - 
HW2 = 
2
1 2
12 ( )
25
c c
b
−  - 21 23 ( )4 c cb −  = - 
2
1 2
27 ( ) 0
100
c c
b
− ≤  
 
FW2 - 
SW2 = 
2
1 2
1 ( )
2
c c
b
−  - 21 212 ( )25 c cb −  = 
2
1 2
1 ( ) 0
50
c c
b
− ≥  
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If the home government sets trade policy at stage one, then foreign welfare is higher if 
the foreign government sets trade policy at stage two rather than at stage one. Setting trade policy 
at stage two is the foreign country’s optimal response to the home country setting trade policy at 
stage one, and setting trade policy at stage one is the dominant strategy for the home country. 
Therefore, the home government setting trade policy at stage one and the foreign government 
setting trade policy at stage two is the Nash equilibrium of stage zero of the game. Q.E.D. 
 
By setting trade policy at stage one the home government commits itself to a lower tariff 
and production subsidy than in the simultaneous-move game, and this encourages the foreign 
government to use a larger export subsidy than in the simultaneous-move game. As a result both 
countries are better off when the home government is the Stackelberg leader than in the 
simultaneous-move game. The home country benefits from a larger foreign export subsidy, and 
the foreign country gains from facing a lower tariff and production subsidy. 
 
Proposition 2: When the ownership and the management are separated for each firm, in the 
subgame perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game, the welfares of both countries are higher 
when compared to the case when ownership and the management are not separated. 
 
Proof: This follows directly from the comparison of home and foreign welfares that we have 
found and those in Collie (1994). In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game, 
when the home government sets its tariff and production subsidy at stage one and the foreign 
government sets its export subsidy at stage two, the welfares of the home and foreign countries 
that we found are: 
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=1W 2 21 1 21 3( ) ( )2 4a c c cb b− + −  
2W
2
1 2
3 ( )
4
c c
b
= −  
 
The corresponding values were found in Collie (1994) as: 
=CW1 2 21 1 21 1( ) ( )2 2a c c cb b− + −  
CW2 =
2
1 2
1 ( )
2
c c
b
−  
 
Comparing we get CWW 11 ≥  and CWW 22 ≥ . Q.E.D. 
 
When compared to those of Collie (1994), our results show that both home and foreign 
welfares are higher. The foreign country is better off since at the unchanged prices and tariff rate 
the foreign firm can supply more to the domestic market. The home country is better off since its 
increased imports raise tariff revenues without leading to any change in domestic consumers' 
surplus or in domestic producer's surplus net of the production subsidy. To see this, notice first 
that home welfare can be considered as the sum of three separate terms: 
 
(i) the home consumers' surplus  derived from the consumption of the good produced in the home 
and foreign countries,  
(ii) the home producer's surplus net of the production subsidy,  
(iii) the import tariff revenue of the home country. 
 
The total consumption of the good remains at the same level as in the Collie (1994) 
model. Thus, the  home consumers' surplus does not change. The home producer's surplus net of 
the production subsidy stays at the same level as in the Collie (1994) model, despite the cut in the 
domestic production since the price of the good in home country is still equal to the domestic  
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marginal cost of production. The import tariff revenue of the home country increases as the 
imports are higher than in the Collie model while there is no change in the tariff rate. So, the 
increase in the welfare of the home country (as compared to the results in Collie (1994) paper) 
arises from the increase in the level of imports. One should note that the separation of the 
managerial incentives from those of the owners’ leads to a lower level of production subsidy, 
which gives rise to a lower level of production for the domestic firm, and a higher level of 
production for the foreign firm. As the domestic firm's surplus net of the production subsidy is 
already zero in an equilibrium  with the price level equalling the domestic marginal cost, it is not 
suprising that the home country becomes better-off if the the share of the imports in the 
unchanged total domestic consumption increases at the unchanged level of tariff rates.  
 
On the other hand,  the welfare of the foreign country can be considered as the foreign 
firm's surplus (profit) net of the export subsidy. It is obvious that with the unchanged domestic 
price and the  domestic import tariff rate, the welfare of the foreign firm is higher with the 
increased exports of the foreign country. 
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4   Conclusions 
 
In this paper strategic trade policy under duopoly is investigated in a multistage game model with 
endogenous timing of trade policy and when the ownership and management are separated for 
each firm. At the beginning of the game, stage zero, home and foreign governments 
independently and simultaneously choose whether to set trade policy at stage one or at stage two. 
Then, at the chosen stage, each government sets its trade policy to maximize its national welfare.  
 
In the next stage, home and foreign firms choose the (relevant determining parameter of) 
objective functions of their managers in a Nash play. The objective functions are selected from 
the class of functions that are convex linear combinations of profits and revenues. Such functions 
can indeed be rewritten as revised profit functions with the cost of production being now scaled 
by the weight of the profit term in the managerial objective function. In the last stage, managers 
in the two countries choose, in Cournot play, the optimal output levels implied by their assigned 
objective functions. It turns out that the firm in each country has an incentive to give positive 
weight to the revenue term in its manager’s objective function if the manager of the rival country 
is instructed to maximize its owner's profits. The competition between the firms then forces in 
equilibrium each firm owner committing their managers to non-profit maximizing behavior. 
 
It is shown that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game, the home 
government sets its tariff and production subsidy at stage one and the foreign government sets its 
export subsidy at stage two. By setting trade policy at stage one the home government commits 
itself to a lower tariff and production subsidy than in the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-
move game, and this encourages the foreign government to use a larger export subsidy than in the 
Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game. As a result both countries are better off when  
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the home government is the Stackelberg leader than in the simultaneous-move game. The home 
country benefits from a larger foreign export subsidy, and the foreign country gains from facing a 
lower tariff and production subsidy. The conclusion for trade policy is that imperfect competition 
does not provide an economic rationale for countervailing duties since the home country should 
commit not to use countervailing duties. When compared to those of Collie (1994), our results 
show that when the ownership and the management are separated for each firm, in the subgame 
perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game, the welfares of both countries are higher.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Comparison of Results in the 
Simultaneous-Move Trade Policy Game 
 Collie (1994) Our Model 
W1 
2 2
1 1 2
1 4( ) ( )
2 9
a c c c
b b
− + −  2 21 1 21 18( ) ( )2 25a c c cb b− + −  
W2 
2
1 2
2 ( )
9
c c
b
−  21 212 ( )25 c cb −  
Π1 
2
1 2
1 (3 5 2 )
9
a c c
b
− +  21 21 (5 11 6 )50 a c cb − +  
Π2 
2
1 2
4 ( )
9
c c
b
−  21 218 ( )25 c cb −  
x1 1 2
1 (3 5 2 )
3
a c c
b
− +  1 21 (5 11 6 )5 a c cb − +  
x2 1 2
2 ( )
3
c c
b
−  1 26 ( )5 c cb −  
P c1 c1 
s 1 2
1 (3 5 2 )
3
a c c− +  1 21 (5 11 6 )10 a c c− +  
t 1 2
2 ( )
3
c c−  1 23 ( )5 c c−  
e 1 2
1 ( )
3
c c−  1 21 ( )5 c c−  
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Table 2. Comparison of Results in the Stackelberg Game  
when the Foreign Government is the First Mover 
 Collie (1994) Our Model 
W1 
2 2
1 1 2
1 1( ) ( )
2 4
a c c c
b b
− + −  2 21 1 21 1( ) ( )2 2a c c cb b− + −  
W2 
2
1 2
1 ( )
4
c c
b
−  21 21 ( )2 c cb −  
Π1 
2
1 2
1 (2 3 )
6
a c c
b
− +  21 21 ( 2 )2 a c cb − +  
Π2 
2
1 2
1 ( )
6
c c
b
−  21 21 ( )2 c cb −  
x1 1 2
1 (2 3 )
3
a c c
b
− +  1 21 ( 2 )a c cb − +  
x2 1 2
1 ( )
3
c c
b
−  1 21 ( )c cb −  
P c1 c1 
s 1 2
1 (2 3 )
2
a c c− +  1 21 ( 2 )2 a c c− +  
t 1 2
1 ( )
2
c c−  1 21 ( )2 c c−  
e 0  0  
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Table 3. Comparison of Results in the Stackelberg Game  
when the Home Government is the First Mover 
 Collie (1994) Our Model 
W1 
2 2
1 1 2
1 1( ) ( )
2 2
a c c c
b b
− + −  2 21 1 21 3( ) ( )2 4a c c cb b− + −  
W2 
2
1 2
1 ( )
2
c c
b
−  21 23 ( )4 c cb −  
Π1 
2
1 2
1 ( 2 )a c c
b
− +  21 21 (2 5 3 )8 a c cb − +  
Π2 
2
1 2
1 ( )c c
b
−  21 29 ( )8 c cb −  
x1 1 2
1 ( 2 )a c c
b
− +  1 21 (2 5 3 )2 a c cb − +  
x2 1 2
1 ( )c c
b
−  1 23 ( )2 c cb −  
P c1 c1 
s 1 22a c c− +  1 21 (2 5 3 )4 a c c− +  
t 1 2
1 ( )
2
c c−  1 21 ( )2 c c−  
e 1 2
1 ( )
2
c c−  1 21 ( )4 c c−  
 
 
Table 4. Payoff Matrix for Trade Policy Game 
 Foreign Government 
Domestic Government Stage One Stage Two 
Stage One SW1 , 
SW2   
HW1 , 
HW2  
Stage Two FW1 , 
FW2  
SW1 , 
SW2  
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3.2   Stage 2: Owners choose their managers’ incentives 
 
Π1(x1, x2) = (P - c1 + s) x1 
}(.)[{ 1
1
scP +−∂
∂
λ )],( 211 λλx  = 0  
⇒ 1
3 1 1 1
1
1
c x P c s
x+ − +( ) ∂∂λ  = 0 
⇒ 1
3
2
31 1 1
1c x P c s
c
b
+ − + −( )( )  = 0 
⇒ bx1 - 2(P - c1 + s) = 0             (6) 
 
Π2(x1, x2) = (P – c2 – t + e) x2 
}(.)[{ 2
2
etcP +−−∂
∂
λ )],( 212 λλx  = 0  
⇒ 1
3 2 2 2
2
2
c x P c t e
x+ − − +( ) ∂∂λ  = 0 
⇒ 1
3
2
32 2 2
2c x P c t e
c
b
+ − − + −( )( )  = 0 
⇒ bx2 - 2(P – c2 - t + e) = 0            (7) 
 
 
3.3   Stage 1: Governments choose their trade policies 
 
W1 = ∫
+
−++−++−−
8
2
8
1
0
*
1
*
2
*
1
*
11
*
2
*
1 )()()(
xx
sxtxsxxcPxxPdQbQa  
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3.3.1   Simultaneous-Move Trade Policy Game: 
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To show that 11 <λ  and 12 <λ , we know that 01 >Sx  and 02 >Sx  by the assumption that there 
is an interior solution where the market is supplied by both domestic production and imports. 
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3.3.2   Stackelberg Game when the Foreign Government is the First Mover: 
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To show that 11 <λ  and 12 <λ , we know that 01 >Sx  and 02 >Sx  by the assumption that there 
is an interior solution where the market is supplied by both domestic production and imports. 
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To show that 11 <λ  and 12 <λ , we know that 01 >Sx  and 02 >Sx  by the assumption that there 
is an interior solution where the market is supplied by both domestic production and imports. 
 
03520 211 >+−⇒> ccax H   12 532 cca −<−−⇒  
 
 
 
55
 
Then, 
1
21
1
392
4
1
c
cca −+−=λ 195
4
1
1
11 =+−<
c
cc
, i.e. 11 <λ  
 
Similarly, 02 >Hx ⇒ 021 >− cc , i.e. 21 cc >  
 
Then, 1
73
4
173
4
1
2
22
2
21
2 =−−<−−= c
cc
c
ccλ , i.e. 12 <λ  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56
 
Chapter 3.   Income Convergence & Intra-Industry Trade 
 
1   Introduction 
The subject of convergence of economic growth is one of the most important issues in modern 
economics. In a world in which countries exchange goods, factors, and ideas; international 
linkages are what drive any convergence process. Free trade in goods can equalize factor prices 
across countries according to the factor-price-equalization theorem; international flows of factors 
can lead to convergence of endowments and factor prices; and international flows of technology 
can cause convergence of factor prices as well. 
 
 In neoclassical growth models a country’s per capita growth rate tends to be inversely 
related to its starting level of per capita income. In particular, if countries are similar with respect 
to structural parameters for preferences and technology, then poor countries tend to grow faster 
than rich countries. That is, it is a prediction of neoclassical economic growth theory that 
differences in per capita income across different economies will tend to decrease or disappear 
over time. This is broadly referred to as the convergence hypothesis.  
 
Though there is evidence of income convergence among some of the wealthy countries 
(Baumol, 1986; Baumol et al., 1989), it is not obvious why some subsets of these countries 
exhibit greater convergence than others, while other subsets of countries display no convergence 
tendencies at all. This paper analyzes this issue from the perspective of trade’s contribution to the 
process. It examines the relationship between international trade and income convergence among 
countries by focusing on groups of countries forming major trade partners.  
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           In analyzing the factors that determine the extent of intra-industry trade in an inter-country 
context, Linder (1961) advanced the hypothesis that the extent of trade in differentiated products 
will be the greater, the more similar are income levels among the trading countries. This 
hypothesis reflects the assumption that similarities in income levels are associated with 
similarities in demand structures. The results of our paper are not sufficient to differentiate 
between the hypothesis that countries that trade a great deal with one another tend to converge, 
and the alternative hypothesis that similar countries tend to trade more. However, an analysis of 
the relationship between trade liberalization and income convergence (Ben-David, 1993, 1994a) 
suggests that it is trade liberalization that produces income convergence, rather than the other way 
around. Although no intra-group income convergence was evident before the trade reforms, 
significant convergence, together with significant increases in the volume of trade, began to occur 
simultaneously with the removal of the trade barriers. These findings provide evidence that it is 
the removal of obstacles to trade which leads to income convergence, rather than just the 
similarity suggested by the Linder hypothesis.  
 
There is an extensive literature about the extent of income convergence among countries. 
This literature, however, is mostly based on models that determine the existence and magnitude 
of convergence through the common cross-country growth regressions. The primary methodology 
used to test for the existence of convergence in these studies was to regress growth rates on initial 
levels of income plus the additional factors that one wished to control for. A negative relationship 
between the rates of growth and the initial incomes was interpreted as implying convergence. In 
our paper, however, convergence will be characterized by the reduction in income differentials 
within specific groups of countries over time.  
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            Another difference between this paper and the earlier papers will be that the primary focus 
here is on intra-industry trade’s relationship to the convergence process. Trade groups are formed 
on the basis of intra-industry trade among countries rather than only exports or imports. No 
attempt is made to analyze and extend the theoretical motivations behind the relationship between 
intra-industry trade and income convergence. The contribution of this paper is by empirically 
noting the existence of such a link. The results from this paper alone are not sufficient to 
distinguish between the hypothesis that countries which (intra-industry) trade a great deal with 
one another tend to converge, and the alternative hypothesis that similar countries tend to trade 
more.15 
 
The analysis includes the 1971-2002 income and trade data of 24 developed countries16 
with per capita incomes of $10,000 or higher in 2002. The first step is to determine each 
country’s primary trade partners and to create trade groups using the intra-industry trade shares of 
the total trade between countries. Having formed the trade groups, the behavior of each group’s 
income differentials over time is examined for a significant evidence of convergence within them. 
The results show that majority of these intra-industry trade-based groups exhibit significant 
convergence. When the trade groups are formed according to the total trade between the countries 
rather than intra-industry trade, we see a significant decrease in the number of the groups which 
exhibit income convergence.  
 
 
                                                 
 
15 Ben-David (1993) and Ben-David (1994a) suggest that it is the trade which causes the countries to 
converge in income, rather than the other way around. 
 
16 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States of America. 
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Then, the robustness and sensitivity of the results are examined from a number of 
different perspectives. To test whether any random grouping of these same countries might 
produce similar results, the 24 source countries are grouped into their many different possible 
subgroups and their convergence coefficients are estimated. To test whether convergence within 
groups might be towards one country that is common to most of the groups, the major trade 
partner of the countries is removed from each of the groups, the new convergence coefficients are 
estimated, and the results are compared. To test whether the tendency towards convergence is 
considerably stronger when the basis for constructing groups is trade rather than proximity or 
common language, the countries are regrouped to reflect geographical closeness or common 
languages; and the degree of convergence within each of these groups are then compared to the 
results of the trade-based groups.  
 
The results show that significant income convergence is not a common outcome among 
countries when they are grouped randomly instead of grouping them according to their trade 
partners; the convergence within groups is not towards one country that is common to most of the 
groups, but is instead an outcome that tends to be relatively robust to the exclusion of the major 
trade partners that are members in most of the groups; and the tendency towards convergence 
appears to be considerably stronger when the basis for constructing groups is trade rather than 
proximity or common language. 
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2   Literature Review 
2.1   Income Convergence 
 
Over the past years, there has been an ongoing debate as to whether the per capita incomes of 
different national economies will converge. This debate has its roots in Heckscher (1919) and 
Ohlin (1933) who hypothesized that free trade will draw factor prices towards equality. This was 
later formalized by Samuelson (1948) as the factor price equalization theorem which provides 
theoretical support for the idea that, under certain conditions, trade should lead to the equalization 
of commodity prices and consequently to the equalization of factor prices. Alternatively, the 
traditional growth literature (Solow, 1956; Cass, 1965) claims that, even in the absence of 
internationally mobile goods and factors, convergence to a steady state path should occur between 
countries provided that they have identical production technologies, population growth, and 
saving rates.17  
 
The convergence debate has been largely empirical, focusing primarily on the validity of 
the following three competing hypotheses: 
 
(i) The absolute convergence hypothesis – per capita incomes of countries converge to one 
another in the long-run independently of their initial conditions.18 
 
(ii) The conditional convergence hypothesis – per capita incomes of countries that are identical in 
their structural characteristics (e.g. preferences, technologies, rates of population growth,  
government policies, etc.) converge to one another in the long-run independently of their initial 
conditions.19 
                                                 
 
17 For a comprehensive survey of convergence and growth literature, see Sala-i Martin (1996), De la Fuente 
(1997), and Temple (1999). 
18 See Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), and Barro (1991) for conclusive evidence against this hypothesis. 
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(iii) The club convergence hypothesis – per capita incomes of countries that are identical in their 
structural characteristics converge to one another in the long-run provided that their initial 
conditions are similar as well.20 
 
The primary methodology used to test for the existence of convergence in several 
studies21 was to regress growth rates on initial levels of income plus the additional factors that 
one wished to control for. A negative relationship between the rates of growth and the initial 
incomes was interpreted as implying convergence. Instead of taking a negative correlation 
between the initial output level of one economy and its subsequent growth rate as evidence of 
convergence, the time series convergence tests investigate for the differences in per capita output 
to decrease over time. Bernard and Durlauf (1995) found that cross-sectional convergence is a 
weaker notion than the time series notion of convergence. Cross-sectional tests tend to falsely 
reject the null of no convergence when economies exhibit multiple long-run steady states. 
 
By grouping countries into three income groups, Baumol (1986) found wealthy countries 
belong to a convergence club, middle-income countries are moderately converging, and poor 
countries are diverging over time. He argued that the public good property of national 
productivity growth gives rise to convergence among industrialized nations; however, the less-
developed countries are unable to converge because of the lack of technology and education. 
Kristensen (1982) grouped countries by their income levels and also found convergence among 
the wealthier countries and divergence among poorer countries.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
19 See Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992), and Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995) for supporting cross-country 
evidence for the conditional convergence hypothesis.  
20 See Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and Quah (1996) for supporting evidence for the club convergence 
hypothesis. 
21 Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), Barro (1991), Levine and Renelt (1992), and Mankiw et al. (1992). 
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Ben-David (1994b) applied the time series notion of convergence and he showed that, in 
contrast to the conventional wisdom, convergence among the relatively developed countries is far 
from being a robust phenomenon. Some countries converge with others, but not with the 
remainder. Other countries converge with different countries, but also not with most. A random 
grouping of the more developed countries will not yield income convergence in more instances 
than it will yield non-convergence. 
 
2.2   Intra-Industry Trade 
Traditional theories of international trade have not been extended to incorporate product 
differentiation, economies of scale, and monopolistic competition; only in the last two decades 
we have seen the emergence of a sizeable literature that links trade theory and industrial 
organization, beginning with the studies of Krugman (1979) and Lancaster (1979). It was further 
extended by Krugman (1981), Helpman (1981), Ethier (1982), and others22. 
 
One group of models that has emerged through the synthesis of international economics 
and industrial organization includes the models of intra-industry trade. Intra-industry trade 
models provide an explanation for the simultaneous export and import of fairly similar goods. In 
these models countries’ markets are characterized by imperfect competition involving 
differentiated products and increasing returns to scale. The opening of trade results in a greater 
product variety and an increased competition with a consequent reduction in costs and prices.  
 
In their pioneering study which fundamentally changed the way economists view the 
causes of international trade, Grubel and Lloyd (1975) established the extent of intra-industry 
trade in different industrial nations, considered some measurement issues, and investigated  
                                                 
 
22 For a survey of the theoretical literature of intra-industry trade, see Bhagwati and Davis (1994). 
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possible causes and consequences of such trade. To point out this fundamental change, Helpman 
and Krugman (1989) refer to intra-industry trade as “one of the key empirical reasons for 
emphasizing the role of increasing returns and imperfect competition in the world economy” 
(Helpman and Krugman , 1989: p.133). 
 
Since the introduction of the concept of intra-industry trade, a large literature developed 
on the subject. Early efforts at the measurement of the extent of intra-industry trade were 
followed by contributions to the theory of intra-industry trade. Furthermore, many studies have 
attempted to identify the determinants of intra-industry trade. They have considerable differences 
in model specification, estimation techniques, and the level of industry aggregation23. 
 
Empirical studies on the intra-industry trade of the developing countries remained an 
underresearched area for a long time, but increasing attention has been paid to this area in recent 
years24. Most previous econometric studies have attempted to explain the intra-industry trade of 
developed countries25. This may be partly because of the belief that the phenomenon of intra-
industry trade is significant only among industrialized countries.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
23 For a comprehensive survey of the empirical literature, see Greenaway and Milner (1986). 
24 Three such studies (Laird, 1981; Lee, 1987; and Gunasekera, 1989) are general reviews. Some other 
papers include Havrylyshyn and Civan, 1983; Tharakan, 1986; Ray, 1991; and Fukasaku, 1992. 
25 Caves (1981), Toh (1982), and Balassa (1986) use the data for the U.S.; Lundberg (1982) for Sweden; 
Greenaway (1983) for the U.K.; Kol and Mennes (1989) for the Netherlands; Tharakan (1986) for Benelux; 
and Loertscher and Wolter (1980) for the OECD countries. 
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2.3   Trade and Income Convergence 
The increase in growth-related research in the past decades has included important contributions 
that have focused on the relationship connecting international trade to economic growth and 
convergence. However, neither traditional trade theory nor the various well known models of 
economic growth offer very formal results that explain the possible connection between 
international trade and income convergence across countries over time. Trade policy directly 
affects the flows of goods and services between different countries, and liberalization of trade 
leads to the convergence of factor prices in those countries – at least under the conditions 
associated with the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelson, 1948). But convergence in 
factor prices does not necessarily imply convergence in incomes. Moreover, even if trade 
liberalization and income convergence are found to co-exist, this does not establish any causal 
relationship between the two, and it does not mean that other variables are unimportant to the 
convergence process. 
 
The recent trade literature offers some theoretical models that deal with the linkages 
between income convergence and trade. For example, addressing trade liberalization, Ben-David 
and Loewy (1996) present a model that focuses on the role of trade in facilitating knowledge 
spillovers, which subsequently can effect positively on income convergence. In related work, 
Ben-David and Loewy (2000) develop an open economy endogenous growth model that 
incorporates knowledge accumulation. Their model predicts that while trade liberalization will 
increase the steady-state output growths of all countries, those countries that participate directly 
in this liberalization will benefit the most in terms of their relative income levels.  
 
Slaughter (1997) discusses the ways in which trade may be associated with income 
convergence. He notes that trade can make the transfer of technology between economies easier,  
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which will change the countries’ factor prices. For this to result in changes in per capita output, 
he points out that situations must be avoided in which factor endowments are diverging 
sufficiently to offset the technology transfer effects. He also states that trade in capital goods can 
lead to convergence in per capita income by changing countries’ relative factor endowments. 
 
The empirical literature has added considerably to our understanding of the relationship 
between international trade and income convergence through the analyses of various sets of data. 
Within this literature we find a number of definitions of convergence, applications of different 
statistical tools, and the emergence of a wide variety of results. The conclusions that one reaches 
depend generally on the type of data, the time-period in question, and the level of development of 
the economies under consideration. The existing evidence on trade and international income 
differences is mixed. There is some evidence for that trade causes convergence and other 
evidence for that it causes divergence.  
 
Using several criteria, Sachs and Warner (1995) classify each country in 1970 as either 
“open” or “closed” to international trade. From 1970 to 1989 only in the group of open countries, 
the poorer countries in 1970 have grown faster over the next 19 years. They conclude that “the 
open economies display a strong tendency towards economic convergence…the convergence club 
is the club of economies linked together by international trade” (Sachs and Warner, 1995: p.41). 
 
Ben-David (1996) finds that from 1960 to 1989, groups of relatively wealthy countries 
which trade significantly among each other tend to display significant per capita income 
convergence relative to the convergence patterns of randomly grouped countries. He concludes 
that “these findings would appear to support the intuition of Heckscher and Ohlin that trade does 
indeed play an equalizing role” (Ben-David, 1996: p.294). 
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Ben-David (1993) analyzes post-1945 trade liberalization and finds that per capita 
income dispersion among liberalizing countries decreased after liberalization started. He writes 
that “this paper provides evidence that movement toward free trade may actually…be leading to a 
reduction in income disparity across countries…The factor price equalization theorem provides a 
framework for relating trade’s impact on income convergence” (Ben-David, 1993: p.653). 
 
Dollar (1992), Edwards (1993), Harrison (1995), and Henrekson et al. (1996) focus on 
the impact of trade openness on economic growth. The results from these studies indicate that 
there is a positive relationship between trade liberalization and per capita income convergence. 
 
On the other hand, Bernard and Jones (1996) conclude that freer trade actually diverges 
incomes across countries. They use cross-section and time series techniques to study the 
movements of productivity levels in 14 OECD countries during 1970-1987. They examine 
technological convergence by focusing on total factor productivity. The results indicate that 
sectoral differences are important for understanding movements in aggregate income and 
productivity. Within sectors across countries there is evidence for convergence for some 
industries, but not for others. These differences across sectors account for convergence at the 
national level. Within manufacturing, they find only weak evidence for convergence over the 
period and find substantial evidence for divergence of productivity levels during the 1980s. Using 
a “difference in differences” methodology developed by Meyer (1994), Slaughter (2001) finds 
that various post-1945 trade liberalization appears to have led to income divergence, rather than 
convergence. Trade-mediated technology flows change countries’ real factor prices and thus per 
capita income. If technology does not flow from advanced to less-advanced countries, then freer 
trade need not converge incomes across countries. Richer countries grow even richer because 
they focus more on the high-technology products. 
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3   Data and Methodology 
3.1   Data 
 
The 1971-2002 income and trade data of 24 developed countries26 are included in the analysis 
with per capita incomes of $10, 000 or higher in 2002. In the order of decreasing per capita GNP, 
these countries are Luxembourg, Norway, USA, Switzerland, Japan, Denmark, Ireland, Iceland, 
United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Canada, Germany, Belgium, France, 
Australia, Italy, Israel, Spain, New Zealand, Portugal, and Greece. The trade statistics are taken 
from World Trade Annuals of the United Nations Statistics Division. GNP data are from the 
International Financial Statistics. 
 
The investigation covers Section 7 of the Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC) industry groups, i.e. “Machinery and Transport Equipment”. This section includes 
technological goods which involve production technologies that are not universally available and 
change relatively frequently. For most industrialized countries, it has been known that intra-
industry trade occurs in these SITC industry groups. These include those industries which share 
the typical characteristics of industries involved in intra-industry trade, such as product 
differentiation, economies of scale, and rapid innovation. Some industry groups in Section 7 
include engines, turbines, motors, power generating machinery, tractors, textile and leather 
machinery, printing machinery, heating-cooling equipment, non-electrical machinery, office 
machines, television receivers, radio broadcast receivers, telecom equipment, transistors, road 
motor vehicles, railway vehicles, aircraft, and ships.  
 
                                                 
 
26 The 24 developed countries in this study are OECD countries. We can extend our study by adding other 
developed countries and/or developing countries. 
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3.2   Grubel-Lloyd Index and Aggregation Problem 
The Grubel-Lloyd (hereafter, GL) index is the central measure of intra-industry trade and almost 
all of the empirical studies have used this index; so in this paper, this measure is employed, which 
is expressed as  
 
IITi = [1 – (| Xi – Mi | / (Xi + Mi))],                  (1) 
 
where Xi is exports of industry i, Mi is imports of industry i, |Xi – Mi | is net trade, (Xi + Mi) is total 
trade, and 0 ≤ IITi ≤ 1. An index value of 0 would indicate complete inter-industry trade. Either 
the value of exports or imports would be zero. Higher index values are associated with greater 
intra-industry trade as a proportion of total trade, with an index value of 1 indicating equality 
between exports and imports. We will use this measure just to create trade groups as explained in 
the next subsection. 
 
When Eq. (1) is aggregated across industries to form a weighted average intra-industry 
trade measure, the resulting index will not attain the desired maximum value of 1 if the country’s 
total commodity trade is imbalanced. The greater is the imbalance, the smaller will be the share of 
intra-industry trade. Based on this finding, GL (1975) argue that this measure of intra-industry 
trade must be adjusted for the aggregate trade imbalance.  
 
According to Vona (1991), and Kol and Mennes (1989), measures of intra-industry trade 
should not be corrected for the overall trade imbalance. Vona (1991) argues that the argument for 
the need of correction is theoretically poor and leads to unreliable adjustment procedure and he 
uses arithmetic examples to establish the superiority of GL’s uncorrected index over corrected  
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indices which appear in the literature. Based on these, this paper will use GL’s uncorrected 
measure of intra-industry trade27. 
 
3.3   Creation of the Trade Groups 
The first step is to define who is a major trade partner of whom and how should the trade groups 
be formed. The usual practice in analyzing the effect of trade on the growth process is to combine 
imports and exports and examine their joint effect. In this paper, the primary focus is on intra-
industry trade’s relationship to the convergence process. Trade groups are formed on the basis of 
intra-industry trade among countries rather than only exports or imports. For each of the 24 
source countries, major intra-industry trade partners are found to form each source country’s trade 
groups. To keep the examination within manageable proportions, the goal is to implement some 
general criterion that limits the size of the trade groups to fewer than ten countries. The 
composition of the intra-industry trade groups is determined according to the following criterion. 
Suppose that country i is one of the 24 source countries. After finding the Grubel-Lloyd intra-
industry trade indices, if the intra-industry trade share of the total trade between country i and 
country j is more than 85% in 2002 (the final year of the sample) 28, then country j will be part of 
country i’s trade group. The groups resulting from the 85% threshold ranged in size from 3 
countries per group to 8 countries per group. Table 1 in the Appendix lists the countries forming 
each of the trade groups. 
 
                                                 
 
27 Ballance et al. (1992), Lundberg (1992), Hamilton and Kniest (1991), and Globerman and Dean (1990) 
are examples of recent studies that do not correct intra-industry trade indices for the overall trade 
imbalance. Bergstrand (1990) uses the GL adjusted index. The methodology and rationale for the 
adjustment is discussed in Bergstrand (1983). 
28 Creating trade groups based on end-of-period (i.e. 2002) trade data is in order to create groups of 
countries that have evolved over time into major trade partners, hence increasing the likelihood of finding 
convergence. If the grouping criterion had been based on beginning-of-period (i.e. 1971) data, it might have 
included countries that were no longer major trade partners by the period’s end. 
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4   The Model 
4.1   Income Convergence Model 
 
Having formed the trade groups, the behavior of each group’s income differentials over time is 
examined for a significant evidence of convergence within them. Following Ben-David (1996), 
the convergence measure is based on the following relationship: 
 
(yi,t - ty ) = Φ (yi,t-1 - 1−ty ) + εi,t,              (2) 
 
where yi,t is the log of country i’s real per capita income at time t and ty  is the average29 of the 
group’s log per capita incomes at time t. Φ < 1 indicates the existence of income convergence 
within the group and Φ > 1 indicates divergence. The estimated Φ provides an indication of the 
rate of convergence within the given group. The half-life30 (h) of the convergence process, the 
number of years that it takes for the income gap to be cut in half is given by ln(0.5) / ln(Φ). 
 
The countries within each group are pooled together for the estimation of Eq. (2) and the 
convergence coefficient Φ is calculated for each group using the Newey-West estimator which 
provides a covariance matrix estimator that is consistent in the presence of both 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 
While there are clearly more sophisticated methods available for estimating convergence 
(see for example, Quah, 1993; Bernard and Durlauf, 1995), the primary attractiveness of this  
                                                 
 
29 This is an unweighted average of the group’s log per capita incomes at time t. We can also give weights 
to countries in the groups according to their GNPs, and use a weighted average. 
 
30 The half life (h) is derived in Ben-David (1993) as follows. If yt+1 = Φ yt , then yt+h = Φh yt. Since yt+x = 
0.5 yt by definition, then 0.5 yt= Φh yt, or 0.5 = Φh. Taking logs of both sides and dividing by log Φ gives h 
as log 0.5 / log Φ. 
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measure lies in its simplicity, its applicability to relatively small groups of countries, and its 
usefulness for conducting relatively quick and simple convergence comparisons across groups 
that include different country compositions. 
 
Results of the Eq. (2) estimation for each of the trade groups are reported in Table 2 in 
the Appendix. The source country of each group is listed first, followed by the number of 
countries in each trade group, the group’s estimated convergence coefficient, standard error, and 
the half-life (double-life) of the convergence (divergence) process. The results indicate that most 
of the trade groups exhibite income convergence; 18 of the 21 groups have a φˆ  less than 1, with 
11 of these outcomes significant at the 10% level at least. Only 3 of the 21 trade groups have an 
estimated convergence coefficient greater than unity and only one of these three outcomes is 
significant at the 5% level.  
 
When the trade groups are formed according to the total trade between the countries 
rather than intra-industry trade, we see a significant decrease in the number of the groups which 
exhibit income convergence. The results in Table 3 in the Appendix show that 14 of the 23 
groups have a φˆ  less than 1, with only 6 of these outcomes significant at the 10% level at least. 
 
4.2   Random Country Groupings 
Are the results in the last section indicative of intra-industry trade-related convergence, or does 
any random grouping of these same countries might produce similar results? To test this, the 21 
source countries are regrouped into their many different possible subgroups, their convergence 
coefficients are estimated, and the results are compared with those in Table 2. Since the intra-
industry trade-based groups ranged in sizes of 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8; the various random subgroups will 
also range in the same sizes. For each subgroup, 500 random samples are estimated. As it is  
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evident from Table 4 in the Appendix, a random grouping of any size is more likely to produce φˆ  
> 1, i.e. a divergence outcome. Percentage of φˆ  that is greater than 1 is 52%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 
and 82% for the group sizes of 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8, respectively. 
 
Table 5 in the Appendix makes it easier to compare the results. For example, Austria’s 
intra-industry trade-based group consists of 8 countries and it has an estimated φˆ  of 0.9953. It 
can be seen that the likelihood of drawing a randomly constructed group of 8 countries out of the 
original 24 countries and getting a φˆ  less than 0.9953 is only 15%.  
 
4.3   Exclusion of Partners 
Is it possible that all of this convergence within groups might be towards one country that is 
common to most of the groups? The United States and Ireland are two candidates for this type of 
bias, since they are trade partners in 8 of the 18 groups which had a φˆ  less than 1. Their removal 
from each of the groups would then reduce the convergence bias, if it exists.  
 
 The estimated convergence coefficients for the intra-industry trade-based groups are 
below unity in all of the 8 groups when USA is excluded (6 of them are significant) and they are 
below unity in 7 of the 8 groups when Ireland is excluded from the groups (6 of them are 
significant). As it can be seen in Table 6 and in Table 7 in the Appendix, the exclusion of the 
USA and Ireland does not significantly change the high incidence of convergence within the trade 
groups. The last column in the tables makes it easier to compare the results. For example, in 
Table 6, Belgium’s intra-industry trade-based group consists of 7 countries when USA is 
excluded and it has an estimated φˆ  of 0.9773. It can be seen that the likelihood of drawing a  
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randomly constructed group of 7 countries out of the original 24 countries (with no USA 
included) and getting a φˆ  less than 0.9773 is only 13%.  
  
4.4   Language and Proximity 
Many of the countries that comprise the trade groups share other characteristics as well. For 
example, 6 of the source countries share English as their primary language. Moreover, quite a few  
of the countries are also in close geographical proximity to one another. Since common language 
and proximity facilitate information flows and these flows are a source of income convergence, 
then it is possible that the income convergence exhibited by the trade groups is due less to trade 
flows than to proximity or common language. After regrouping the countries to reflect common 
languages or geographical closeness, the degree of convergence within each of these groups could 
be compared with the results of the intra-industry trade-based groups.  
 
Geographical proximity is defined to be a neighboring country with a common border, or 
when the border is water, the nearest neighbor across the water. In keeping with the trade group’s 
minimum size of three, only proximity and language-based groups with at least three countries 
were examined. Under these criteria, there are 16 regional groups and one language group 
(English) the composition of which may be found in Table 8 in the Appendix. As the results in 
Table 9 in the Appendix indicate, there is no evidence of significant convergence within the 
group of English-speaking countries. As far as geography-based groups are concerned, just 7 of 
16 groups (less than one half of the groups) exhibit income convergence at a significance level of 
10% or higher. On the other hand we had found in Section 4.1 that approximately two-thirds (13 
of 21) of the intra-industry trade-based groups exhibited significant convergence. Thus, the 
tendency towards convergence appears to be stronger when the basis for constructing groups is 
trade rather than proximity or common language. 
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5   Conclusions 
 
In this paper we attempt to present evidence that income convergence among countries seems to 
be a common feature among countries that trade extensively with one another, especially in those 
industries which share the typical characteristics of industries involved in intra-industry trade, 
such as product differentiation, economies of scale, and rapid innovation.  
 
Grouping countries according to their primary intra-industry trade partnerships tends to 
produce significant income convergence within the groups. When the trade groups are formed 
according to the total trade between the countries rather than intra-industry trade, we see a 
significant decrease in the number of the groups which exhibit income convergence. Significant 
income convergence is not a common outcome among countries when they are grouped 
randomly. Moreover, this convergence is not towards one country that is common to most of the 
groups, but is instead an outcome that tends to be relatively robust to the exclusion of trade 
patterns that are members in most of the groups. Finally, the tendency towards convergence 
appears to be considerably stronger when the basis for constructing groups is trade rather than 
proximity or common language. 
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Appendix 
Table 1. List of Countries in Trade Groups (IIT-Based Groups) 
Source Country Countries in Group                                                                            . 
Austria   Belgium, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Sweden, USA 
Belgium  France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Netherlands, USA 
Canada   Denmark, Ireland, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, USA 
Denmark  Austria, Canada, Finland, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, USA 
Finland   Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Sweden 
France   Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Switzerland, USA 
Germany  Austria, Ireland, Portugal 
Iceland   Greece, Portugal 
Ireland   Japan, UK, USA 
Israel   Greece, Iceland, USA 
Italy   Austria, Finland, France, Ireland, Sweden, UK, USA 
Japan   Ireland, Sweden 
Luxemburg  Sweden, UK 
Netherlands Belgium, Canada, Germany, Sweden 
Norway  Australia, Canada, UK 
Portugal  Australia, Austria, Germany, Iceland 
Spain   Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Switzerland, UK 
Sweden   Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, UK 
Switzerland  Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxemburg, Sweden 
UK    France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, USA 
USA   Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, UK 
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Table 2. Trade Groups’ Convergence Coefficients (IIT-Based Groups) 
   Source Countrya #b         φˆ       Standard Error   Half-life     Double-life 
Austria    8       0.9953   0.0055           147                0 
Belgium     7       0.9867   0.0065**        52                0 
Canada    7       0.9913   0.0052*            79                0 
Denmark   8       0.9781   0.0057***            31                0 
Finland    7       0.9951   0.0094        141                0 
France    8       0.9788   0.0051***            32                0 
Germany   4       0.9961   0.0052         177                0 
 Iceland   3       0.9985   0.0053           462                0 
 Ireland    4       0.9821   0.0076**              38                0 
 Israel    4       1.0027   0.0047               0            257 
 Italy    8       0.9812   0.0068***             37                0 
 Japan    3       0.9802   0.0080 **            35                0 
 Luxemburg  3   1.0283    0.0125           0              25 
 Netherlands  5       0.9737   0.0133**         26                0 
 Norway   4       1.0167   0.0070            0              42 
 Portugal   5       0.9941   0.0053        117                0 
 Spain        7       0.9827        0.0043***      40          0 
 Sweden   8       0.9952   0.0065           144                0 
 Switzerland  7       0.9921   0.0071        87                0  
 UK    8       0.9927   0.0033**             95                0 
 USA            7       0.9859   0.0069**            49                0     . 
                           a Source countries include those countries for which there are at least two other countries  
   such that the intra-industry trade share of the total trade between the source country and  
   the other country is more than 85% in 2002. Australia, Greece, and New Zealand do not  
   satisfy this criterion. 
     b # represents the number of countries in each group. The countries in each group are in Table 1. 
*** Significantly less than 1 at the 1%level. 
  ** Significantly less than 1 at the 5%level.  
        * Significantly less than 1 at the 10%level.     
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Table 3. Trade Groups’ Convergence Coefficients (Trade-Based Groups) 
   Source Countrya #b         φˆ       Standard Error   Half-life     Double-life 
      Australia   6       1.0067   0.0067               0            104 
      Austria    5       0.9962   0.0051            182                0 
      Belgium     7       0.9959   0.0047           169                0 
 Denmark   8       1.0048   0.0059               0            145 
      Finland    8       0.9914   0.0053          80                0 
      France    8       0.9947   0.0043                130                0 
      Germany       10      0.9882   0.0042***           58                0 
       Greece         7       1.0013   0.0046              58                0 
 Iceland    9       0.9981   0.0047              364                0 
  Ireland    7       0.9812   0.0071***             36                0 
      Israel    7       0.9877   0.0053 **              56                0 
 Italy    8       0.9886   0.0041***             56                0 
  Japan    3       1.0031   0.0057             0            223 
 Luxemburg   6   1.0228    0.0091            0              30 
      Netherlands   7       0.9959   0.0047       168                0 
 New Zealand  6       1.0067   0.0067            0            103 
 Norway   8       1.0048   0.0059            0            144 
       Portugal   5       0.9922   0.0048            88                0 
       Spain        7       0.9948        0.0043     132          0 
     Sweden       10      1.0002     0.0061             0          3466 
       Switzerland  7       0.9855   0.0046***       47                0  
  UK    9       0.9899   0.0044**             68                0 
     USA            5      1.0023    0.0072                0            301     . 
                           a Source countries include those countries for which there are at least two other countries  
   such that the trade share between the source country and the other country is more  
   than 4% in 2002. Australia, Greece, and New Zealand do not satisfy this criterion. 
 *** Significantly less than 1 at the 1%level. 
  ** Significantly less than 1 at the 5%level.  
        * Significantly less than 1 at the 10%level.     
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Table 4. Distribution of Convergence Coefficients 
                                                              Group size                   .  
                              3           4           5          7          8   .    
                φˆ                                     Percentages                  .      
      1     48          40        30        20        18  
         0.99    33   25  18      12     10 
       0.98    23        18       12        7       5 
       0.97    15        12         7        3       2 
       0.96    12          8          5        1.6       1.2 
0.95    10          5         2        1.2  1.0 
       0.94          8          3       1        0.6        0.4    
   0.93        5          2         0.8   0.4  0.2 
       0.92         4          1         0.4   0.2  0.2 
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Table 5. Comparison of the Results when Groups are Formed Randomly 
Source Countrya #b              φˆ c      Probabilityd 
Austria    8          0.9953   15 
              Belgium            7          0.9867   10 
Canada    7          0.9913   13 
Denmark   8          0.9781     4 
Finland          7          0.9951   16 
France    8          0.9788      4 
Germany   4          0.9961    34 
Iceland    3          0.9985    45 
Ireland    4          0.9821  20 
Italy    8          0.9812      6 
Japan    3          0.9802    23 
Netherlands  5          0.9737      9 
Portugal   5          0.9941  22 
  Spain        7          0.9827         8 
Sweden          8          0.9952  14 
Switzerland   7          0.9921  13 
UK     8          0.9927   12 
USA    7          0.9859     10        . 
a Source countries include those countries for which the intra-industry 
trade-based group exhibited income convergence. 
b # represents the number of countries in each group. The countries in  
each group are listed in Table 1. 
c Φ represents the intra-industry trade-based group’s estimated convergence 
coefficient. 
d Probability denotes the likelihood of drawing a randomly constructed  
group of corresponding size and getting a convergence coefficient which  
is less than Φ that is listed in the third column of the table. 
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Table 6. Comparison of the Results when USA is Excluded 
             Source Countrya #b           φˆ c    Standard Error     Probabilityd 
               Belgium                7  0.9773     0.0056***   13 
 Canada         7  0.9918     0.0062   15 
 Denmark         8  0.9727     0.0125 **     6 
 France          8  0.9752      0.0064***     8 
 Ireland          4  0.9835    0.0045***           18 
 Italy          8  0.9861      0.0137     5 
 UK          8  0.9909     0.0049*       11 
 USA          7  0.9859      0.0057 **   15     . 
    a Source countries include those countries for which the  
intra-industry trade-based group exhibited income convergence  
and USA was in the group. 
b # represents the number of countries in each group. The countries  
in each group are listed in Table 1. 
c Φ represents the intra-industry trade-based group’s estimated  
convergence coefficient when USA is removed from the group. 
d Probability denotes the likelihood of drawing a randomly constructed  
group of corresponding size and getting a convergence coefficient  
which is less than Φ that is listed in the third column of the table. 
  *** Significantly less than 1 at the 1%level. 
    ** Significantly less than 1 at the 5%level.  
             * Significantly less than 1 at the 10%level.     
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Table 7. Comparison of the Results when Ireland is Excluded 
             Source Countrya #b             φˆ c     Standard Error Probabilityd 
               Belgium                7          0.9923   0.0035**  11 
 Canada   7          0.9876   0.0041***  17 
 France    8          0.9827  0.0026***      8 
 Ireland    4          0.9835  0.0038***  15   
 Italy    8          0.9903  0.0054*      9  
 Japan    3          1.0092  0.0059   28 
 Spain    7          0.9859  0.0061**  18 
 USA    7          0.9992     0.0036   13       .  
    a Source countries include those countries for which the  
intra-industry trade-based group exhibited income convergence  
and Ireland was in the group. 
b # represents the number of countries in each group. The countries  
in each group are listed in Table 1. 
c Φ represents the intra-industry trade-based group’s estimated  
convergence coefficient when Ireland is removed from the group. 
d Probability denotes the likelihood of drawing a randomly constructed  
group of corresponding size and getting a convergence coefficient  
which is less than Φ that is listed in the third column of the table. 
  *** Significantly less than 1 at the 1%level. 
    ** Significantly less than 1 at the 5%level.  
             * Significantly less than 1 at the 10%level.     
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Table 8. List of Countries in Language and Geographical Groups 
Source Country  Countries in Group                                                                               . 
Language-based group 
English   Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK, USA 
Geography-based groups 
Austria   Germany, Italy, Switzerland 
Belgium  France, Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands, UK 
Denmark  Germany, Norway, Sweden 
Finland   Norway, Sweden 
France   Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Spain, Switzerland, UK 
Germany           Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Switzerland 
Iceland   Ireland, Norway, UK 
Ireland   Iceland, UK 
Italy   Austria, France, Switzerland 
Luxemburg  Belgium, France, Germany 
Netherlands Belgium, Germany 
Norway  Denmark, Finland, Sweden 
Spain   France, Portugal 
Sweden   Denmark, Finland, Norway 
Switzerland  Austria, France, Germany, Italy 
UK    Belgium, France, Ireland, Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
 
90
 
Table 9. Convergence Coefficients of Groups Based on Language and Proximity 
Source Countrya  #b         φˆ     t-statistic    . 
Language-based group 
English     6       0.9879    0.0076 
Geography-based groups 
Austria     4       0.9787    0.0044*** 
     Belgium                       6       1.0307    0.0097 
Denmark    4       1.0091    0.0103 
Finland     3       1.0067    0.0123 
France     8       0.9953    0.0056 
Germany    8       0.9934    0.0082 
Iceland     4       0.9864    0.0089 
Ireland     3       0.9771    0.0111** 
Italy     4       0.9824    0.0041*** 
Luxemburg    4       1.0321    0.0092 
Netherlands   3       0.9001    0.0319*** 
Norway    4       0.9985    0.0121 
Spain     3       0.9911    0.0046* 
Sweden     4    0.9985    0.0121 
Switzerland    5       0.9789    0.0046*** 
UK      5       0.9673    0.0106*** . 
a Source countries include those countries for which proximity  
and language-based groups contain at least three countries.  
b # represents the number of countries in each group. The countries  
in each group are listed in Table 8. 
                    *** Significantly less than 1 at the 1%level. 
                         ** Significantly less than 1 at the 5%level. 
                               * Significantly less than 1 at the 10%level. 
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Chapter 4.   Determinants of Intra-Industry Trade in a Multi-
Country & Multi-Industry Framework: An Empirical Analysis  
 
1   Introduction 
Traditional theories of international trade have not been extended to incorporate product 
differentiation, economies of scale, and monopolistic competition; only in the last two decades 
we have seen the emergence of a sizeable literature that links trade theory and industrial 
organization, beginning with the studies of Krugman (1979) and Lancaster (1979). 
 
One group of models that has emerged through the synthesis of international economics 
and industrial organization includes the models of intra-industry trade. Intra-industry trade 
models provide an explanation for the simultaneous export and import of fairly similar goods. In 
these models countries’ markets are characterized by imperfect competition involving 
differentiated products and increasing returns to scale. The opening of trade results in a greater 
product variety and an increased competition with a consequent reduction in costs and prices.  
 
Trade theorists have provided rigorous and elegant models generating intra-industry 
trade. In their pioneering study which fundamentally changed the way economists view the 
causes of international trade, Grubel and Lloyd (1975) established the extent of intra-industry 
trade in different industrial nations, considered some measurement issues, and investigated 
possible causes and consequences of such trade. To point out this fundamental change, Helpman 
and Krugman (1989: p.133) refer to intra-industry trade as “one of the key empirical reasons for 
emphasizing the role of increasing returns and imperfect competition in the world economy”. 
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Krugman (1979), Lancaster (1980), and Helpman (1981) developed intra-industry trade 
theory (IIT) using a monopolistic competition model to explain modern trade patterns. The model 
allows for the presence of increasing returns to scale in production and for differentiated 
products. Intra-industry trade may arise under their framework. Krugman (1979) first generated a 
model in which monopolistically competitive firms produced differentiated products with an 
increasing returns to scale (IRTS) technology. He later extended this model (Krugman, 1981) to 
allow for both intra- and inter-industry trade. These models were further developed in Helpman 
and Krugman (1985). In general, these models are characterized by increasing returns on the 
production side and a utility model that rewards product diversity on the consumption side. A 
common result in these models is that countries trade similar goods.  
 
Since the introduction of the concept of intra-industry trade, a large literature developed 
on the subject. Early efforts at the measurement of the extent of intra-industry trade were 
followed by contributions to the theory of intra-industry trade. Furthermore, many studies have 
attempted to identify the determinants of intra-industry trade. They have considerable differences 
in model specification, estimation techniques, and the level of industry aggregation31. 
 
In the literature, one group of authors has concentrated on the measurement of intra-
industry trade. Another group has taken econometric approaches and attempted to test the theory 
of intra-industry trade with data on an observed country or a group of countries. This research 
belongs to the second group. This study provides recent evidence on determinants of the intra-
industry trade in a multi-country & multi-industry framework. Bilateral trade data of the year 
2002 at three-digit SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) industry groups is used for 
24 developed countries, namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,  
                                                 
 
31 For a comprehensive survey of the empirical literature, see Greenaway and Milner (1986). 
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Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and USA.  
 
First, a theoretical summary of a two-country model based on product differentiation and 
economies of scale is provided, following Helpman (1981) and Helpman and Krugman (1985). 
Then, using this model, the determinants of bilateral intra-industry trade are analyzed in the trade 
of each country with every other country in each industry category. The hypotheses that are tested 
in this study investigate the effect of the following country characteristics on the bilateral intra-
industry trade: average country size, average per capita income, country size difference, per 
capita income difference, distance, common border, participation in economic integration 
systems, and common language. 
 
This paper follows closely the studies of Helpman (1981), Helpman and Krugman (1985, 
ch.7), and Kim and Oh (2001). This research contributes to the existing literature of intra-industry 
trade in several ways. This study employs very recent trade data, namely data of 2002. Second, 
the data in the analysis is wide-ranging32; 24 developed countries are included. Third, this study 
concentrates on testing country characteristics while most empirical studies33 of intra-industry 
trade have concentrated on testing industry characteristics such as economies of scale and product 
differentiation. Fourth, the empirical analysis covers a wide variety of country characteristics 
together, which are developed separately in the literature, i.e., average country size, average per  
 
                                                 
 
32 The total number of observations is expected to be 12, 144 (= 24C2 (= 276) country combinations x 44 
SITC categories) but in considerable amount of cases (18 %) neither exports nor imports exist in bilateral 
trade flows. Then the index of intra-industry trade is not defined and these observations are excluded from 
the analysis. 
33 Clark (1993), Lundberg (1992), Ray (1991), Hamilton and Kniest (1991), Marvel and Ray (1987), 
Balassa (1986), Greenaway and Milner (1984). 
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capita income, country size difference, per capita income difference, distance, common border, 
participation in economic integration systems, and common language. 
 
The empirical results show that the extent of intra-industry trade is positively correlated 
with average GNP, average GNP/capita, and the existence of a common border; and it is 
negatively correlated with differences in GNP and GNP/capita, and distance. All the variables are 
highly significant statistically. The EU and NAFTA dummy variables have the expected positive 
sign and are highly significant statistically. The regression coefficients of the language dummy 
variables have a positive sign, but their level of statistical significance varies. Moreover, the 
results show that the variables Average GNP and Difference in GNP are the country 
characteristics that contribute the most to the explanatory power of the regression equations.  
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2   Literature Review 
The traditional Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model leads us to expect that trade should typically 
be between countries with different factor endowments – capital-abundant countries should trade 
with labor-abundant; the composition of trade should reflect the sources of comparative 
advantage; and trade should have strong effects on income distribution, i.e. when a country trades 
capital–intensive exports for labor-intensive imports, its workers should end up worse off.  
 
What empirical studies found out was that trends in world trade did not seem to accord 
with these expectations. The largest and rapidly growing part of world trade was trade among the 
industrial countries, which seemed fairly similar in their factor endowments and were clearly 
becoming more similar over time.  
 
In the early 1980s came the crucial theoretical development and the theory of intra-
industry trade has become part of mainstream international economics, when subsequent 
investigations were motivated by theories based on horizontal product differentiation, 
monopolistic competition, and increasing returns to scale. This synthesis of industrial 
organization and international trade was first proposed independently in papers by Krugman 
(1979), Dixit and Norman (1980), and Lancaster (1980). It was further extended by Krugman 
(1981), Helpman (1981), Ethier (1982), and others34.  
          
The pioneering Helpman-Krugman model demonstrates intra-industry trade, based on 
specialization in different varieties due to economies of scale in the manufacturing sector 
(Helpman, 1981; Helpman and Krugman, 1985). The model includes both the elements of  
                                                 
 
34 For a survey of the theoretical literature of intra-industry trade, see Bhagwati and Davis (1994). 
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product differentiation and monopolistic competition. Every firm chooses a variety and its price 
to maximize profits, taking as given the variety choice and pricing strategy of the other producers 
in the industry. In this case every firm ends up producing a different variety of the product. Under 
a demand structure within which there is a taste of variety, for every pair of countries that 
produce varieties of the good, intra-industry trade will be observed. Under monopolistic 
competition, each country will produce different varieties of the product, every variety will be 
demanded in both countries and consumers will benefit from an increased number of varieties and 
from lower prices.  
 
In analyzing the factors that determine the extent of intra-industry trade in an inter-
country context, Linder (1961) advanced the hypothesis that the extent of trade in differentiated 
products will be the greater, the more similar are income levels among the trading countries. This 
hypothesis reflects the assumption that similarities in income levels are associated with 
similarities in demand structures. Helpman (1981) provided proof of the proposition that the 
extent of intra-industry trade will be the greater, the more similar is the size of the trading 
partners. This proposition can be expressed in the form of a testable hypothesis that the extent of 
intra-industry trade is negatively correlated with inter-country differences in regard to the gross 
national product, taken to be a measure of market size. 
  
Empirical studies on the intra-industry trade of the developing countries remained an 
underresearched area for a long time, but increasing attention has been paid to this area in recent 
years35. Most previous econometric studies have attempted to explain the intra-industry trade of  
 
                                                 
 
35 Three such studies (Laird, 1981; Lee, 1987; and Gunasekera, 1989) are general reviews. Some other 
papers include Havrylyshyn and Civan, 1983; Tharakan, 1986; Ray, 1991; and Fukasaku, 1992. 
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developed countries36. This may be partly because of the belief that the phenomenon of intra-
industry trade is significant only among industrialized countries. 
 
Two studies focus on the most direct proposition of the Helpman-Krugman model, that 
the proportion of intra-industry as opposed to inter-industry trade should be positively correlated 
with the degree of similarity between countries’ capital-labor ratios. Loertscher and Wolter 
(1980) use differences in per capita income as a proxy for differences in resource endowments, 
and confirm the correlation using a cross-section for a single year. Helpman (1987) uses a more 
extended data set to confirm the proposition over a number of years; he also shows that as the 
industrial countries became more similar over time, the relative importance of intra-industry trade 
grew, just as the model would suggest.  
 
The Helpman-Krugman model was also tested by Lynde (1992). He performed an 
econometric analysis of the trade flows of 52 countries for the year 1980, with the aim of 
comparing the accuracy of the predictions of the Helpman-Krugman model. Lynde’s findings 
were very consistent with the predictions of the Helpman-Krugman model.  
 
Havrylyshyn and Civan (1983) confirm a proposition that intra-industry trade is likely to 
be more common in the trade between developed countries than in the trade between developing 
countries, on the assumption that developed countries produce more differentiated products. 
 
Greenaway and Milner (1986) have surveyed the literature on the testing of hypotheses 
concerning intra-industry trade. They suggest that the hypotheses can be classified in three 
groups. The first group of studies identifies country-specific characteristics that influence the  
                                                 
 
36 Loertscher and Wolter (1980) use the data for the OECD countries; Lundberg (1982) for Sweden; 
Greenaway (1983) for the U.K.; Tharakan (1986) for Benelux; and  Balassa (1986) for the U.S.. 
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extent of intra-industry trade37. The empirical results show that the extent of intra-industry trade is 
positively correlated with country characteristics. The general consistency of the signs and the 
significance levels of the coefficients give support for the country-specific hypotheses. 
 
The second group of studies has emphasized industry-specific determinants of intra-
industry trade relating to scale economies, product differentiation, and imperfect competition38. 
Greenaway and Milner conclude that there are some systematic inter-industry characteristics of 
intra-industry trade, and varying degrees of support for the hypotheses, but country characteristics 
seem to be more important than industry characteristics in explaining intra-industry trade. 
 
The final group of empirical studies analyzed policy-based hypotheses relating to tariffs, 
non-tariff barriers, and economic integration39. Greenaway and Milner conclude that there is no 
consistent empirical evidence that variations in intra-industry trade can be explained by policy 
interventions.  
 
A more recent study is Kim and Oh (2001). From the cross-sectional analysis using 1970-
1994 data, results are obtained that support the following three empirical hypotheses: The share 
of intra-industry trade will be large: (a) if the two economies are of similar size, (b) if the capital-
labor endowment ratio of both countries is similar, and (c) if the total size of the two economies is 
large. 
 
                                                 
 
37 Loertscher and Wolter (1980), Havrylyshyn and Civan (1983), Balassa (1986), and Globerman and Dean 
(1990). 
38 Culem and Lundberg (1983), Greenaway and Milner (1984), Balassa (1986), Marvel and Ray (1987), 
Ray (1991), Hamilton and Kniest (1991), Lundberg (1992), and Clark (1993). 
39 Balassa (1986), Bergstrand (1983), Havrylyshyn and Civan (1983), Toh (1982), Caves (1981), and 
Loertscher and Wolter (1980). 
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3   Data and Methodology 
3.1   Data 
Trade data of 2002 for 24 developed countries are included in the analysis with per capita 
incomes of $10, 000 or higher. In the order of decreasing per capita GNP, these countries are 
Luxembourg, Norway, USA, Switzerland, Japan, Denmark, Ireland, Iceland, United Kingdom, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Canada, Germany, Belgium, France, Australia, Italy, 
Israel, Spain, New Zealand, Portugal, and Greece. 
         
The investigation covers 44 three-digit industry groups which belong to Section 7 of the 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) system. The three-digit SITC classification is 
typically considered an ‘industry’ for econometric purposes. Import and export data with a value 
of $50,000 or more are included in the analysis. Trade statistics are taken from World Trade 
Annuals of the United Nations Statistics Division. GNP data are from the International Financial 
Statistics. Per capita GNP data is from IMF, World Economic Outlook Database. GNP in current 
prices is used as a proxy variable for the size of the economies, and per capita GNP is used for the 
capital-labor endowment ratio. 
 
Section 7, i.e. “Machinery and Transport Equipment” includes technological goods which 
involve production technologies that are not universally available and change relatively 
frequently. For most industrialized countries, it has been known that intra-industry trade occurs in 
these SITC industry groups. These include those industries which share the typical characteristics 
of industries involved in intra-industry trade, such as product differentiation, economies of scale, 
and rapid innovation. Some industry groups in Section 7 include engines, turbines, motors, power 
generating machinery, tractors, textile and leather machinery, printing machinery, heating-cooling 
equipment, non-electrical machinery, office machines, television receivers, radio broadcast  
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receivers, telecom equipment, transistors, road motor vehicles, railway vehicles, aircraft, and 
ships.  
 
The total number of observations is 12, 144 (=24C2 (=276) country combinations x 44 
SITC categories); but in 18 % of cases neither exports nor imports exist in bilateral trade flows, 
so intra-industry trade index is not defined and these observations are excluded from the analysis. 
So then we have a total of 9976 observations.  
 
3.2   Grubel-Lloyd Index and Aggregation Problem 
The Grubel-Lloyd (hereafter, GL) index is the central measure of intra-industry trade and almost 
all of the empirical studies have used this index; so at this research, this measure will be 
employed, expressed as  
 
IITi = [1 – (| Xi – Mi | / (Xi + Mi))],                (1) 
 
where Xi is exports of industry i, Mi is imports of industry i, |Xi – Mi | is net trade, (Xi + Mi) is total 
trade, i = 1,…,n and 0 ≤ IITi ≤ 1. An index value of 0 would indicate complete inter-industry 
trade. Either the value of exports or imports would be zero. Higher index values are associated 
with greater intra-industry trade as a proportion of total trade, with an index value of 1 indicating 
equality between exports and imports. 
 
When Eq. (1) is aggregated across industries to form a weighted average intra-industry 
trade measure, the resulting index will not attain the desired maximum value of 1 if the country’s 
total commodity trade is imbalanced. The greater is the imbalance, the smaller will be the share of 
intra-industry trade. Based on this finding, GL (1975) argue that this measure of intra-industry 
trade must be adjusted for the aggregate trade imbalance.  
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According to Vona (1991), and Kol and Mennes (1989), measures of intra-industry trade 
should not be corrected for the overall trade imbalance. Vona (1991) argues that the argument for 
the need of correction is theoretically poor and leads to unreliable adjustment procedure and he 
uses arithmetic examples to establish the superiority of GL’s uncorrected index over corrected 
indices which appear in the literature. Based on these, the proposed study will employ GL’s 
uncorrected measure of intra-industry trade40. 
 
3.3   Estimation Techniques 
In estimating the determinants of intra-industry trade, most authors use a linear or log-linear 
function by ordinary least squares (e.g., Toh, 1982; Lundberg, 1982; and Tharakan, 1986). We 
will use OLS and truncated regression. We have truncated data since we don’t allow our 
observations to be less than 0 or greater than 1; that is the sample is drawn from a restricted part 
of the population. When using OLS, Newey-West estimator is used which provides a covariance 
matrix that is consistent in the presence of both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 
3.4 Methodology 
In following, we state the hypotheses that have been tested in our paper and define the 
explanatory variables used in the estimation. We also refer to the theoretical literature where the 
hypotheses originate. 
 
It is hypothesized that the extent of intra-industry trade between any pair of countries will be: 
(1) positively correlated with average per capita incomes, representing the extent of demand for 
differentiate products (Linder, 1961); 
                                                 
 
40 Ballance et al. (1992), Lundberg (1992), Hamilton and Kniest (1991), and Globerman and Dean (1990) 
are examples of recent studies that do not correct intra-industry trade indices for the overall trade 
imbalance. Bergstrand (1990) uses the GL adjusted index. The methodology and rationale for the 
adjustment is discussed in Bergstrand (1983: pp. 206-209). 
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(2) negatively correlated with differences in per capita incomes, representing differences in 
demand structures (Linder, 1961) and / or differences in resource endowments (Dixit and 
Norman, 1980; Helpman, 1981); 
 
(3) positively correlated with average country size, indicating the possibilities for increasing the 
variety of differentiated products manufactured under economies of scale (Lancaster, 1980); and 
 
(4) negatively correlated with differences in country size, indicating differences in their ability to 
manufacture differentiated products (Dixit and Norman, 1980; Helpman, 1981). 
 
In testing hypotheses (1) to (4), per capita income has been represented by GNP per 
capita and country size by GNP. Instead of taking the absolute values of inter-country differences 
in per capita incomes and size, following Balassa (1986), we have used a measure indicating 
relative differences that takes values between 0 and 1. This measure is superior to utilizing the 
absolute values of the differences, which are affected by the magnitudes of the particular country 
characteristics in the different countries. The relative difference measure is shown in (4), 
 
INEQ = 1 + [w lnw +(1-w) ln(1-w)] / ln2, where   (2) 
 
w refers to the ratio of a particular country characteristic in country j to the sum of this 
characteristic in country j and partner country k.41 
 
It is hypothesized that the extent of intra-industry trade between any pair of countries will be: 
(5) negatively correlated with the distance between them, representing the availability and the 
cost of information necessary for trading differentiated products; and 
                                                 
 
41 This measure is symmetrical with respect to country characteristics; it is not affected by a change in the 
unit of measurement, and it is a convex function of w. 
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(6) positively correlated with the existence of common borders, indicating the possibilities for 
intra-industry trade in response to locational advantages (Grubel and Lloyd, 1975). 
 
In testing hypothesis (5), distance has been measured in terms of miles between the centers of 
geographical gravity for each pair of countries. In turn, the existence of common borders 
(hypothesis 6) has been represented by a dummy variable. 
 
It is hypothesized that the extent of intra-industry trade between any pair of countries will be: 
(7) positively correlated with participation in regional integration schemes, including the 
European Union and the North American Free Trade Association, indicating the possibilities of 
intra-industry trade in the framework of regional integration schemes. 
 
(8) positively correlated with the use of a common language, including English, German, French, 
and Scandinavian (Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish). 
 
Hypothesis (7) has been tested by introducing dummy variables to represent participation in 
the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). In testing 
hypothesis (8), dummy variables are introduced for each of the languages for any pair of 
countries where the same language is spoken. 
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4   The Model 
4.1   The Theory 
This section summarizes the theoretical model; the following framework is similar to that of 
Helpman (1981), Helpman and Krugman (1985, ch.7), and Kim and Oh (2001).  
 
4.1.1  Closed Economy 
Consider a 2 x 2 x 2 economy in which capital and labor are the only factors of production, and 
output consists of two goods; the differentiated product X, and the homogeneous product Y. There 
is a perfectly competitive market for Y. Monopolistic competition and economies of scale prevail 
in industry X. 
 
 Consumers are assumed to maximize Cobb-Douglas utility functions, 
)1()/(
1
)( αραρ −
=
∑= yU n
i
ix )  0<α <1, 0< ρ <1   (3) 
where ix  and y are the consumption levels for the respective products and n is the number of 
differentiated products in the X industry, α  and ρ  are constants, and α  is the share of total 
consumption given to the consumption of X. Cost functions for X and Y are shown in Equations 4 
and 5. The first cost function is homogeneous of degree one and the second cost function is a 
homothetic function with economies of scale. 
YrwCYrwC Y ),(),,( =           (4) 
)(),(),,( XerwCXrwC X=          (5) 
Here w, r are wage and rent respectively, e(X) is a differentiable decreasing function, which 
implies the economies of scale. Cy(.) and Cx(.) are differentiable concave functions. From the 
above presumptions, we obtain the following equilibrium conditions: 
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The homogeneous product Y, is taken to be the numeraire ( 1=YP ). S is an auxiliary variable 
defined in Equation 13 for simple calculation, after Helpman (1981). SP  is the price of S. L and K 
are the capital and labor endowment of the economy. The model consists of eight equations, 
where Equations 6-10 are identical to the Heckscher-Ohlin model. From these five equations, the 
equilibrium values of the five endogenous variables w, r, SP , S, Y are obtained. The solutions for 
X, SP , n are obtained from Equations 11-13, leading to solutions for all eight variables. 
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4.1.2  Integrated Economy 
Now consider a two-country model with identical production functions and utility functions. Free 
trade between the countries equalizes the prices of products and factors of production. Thus, the 
integrated economy under free trade shows the same characteristics as the closed economy. The 
degree of difference in factor proportions is defined as in Equation 14. 
L
L
K
KD
HH
H −=   -1 1≤≤ HD     (14) 
Here, the superscripts H and F denote the home and foreign country, respectively. L and K are 
world labor and capital, and HD is the difference between the factor endowments of the countries. 
HD  > 0 implies that the home country is capital abundant and HD  < 0 means that the home 
country is labor abundant. From FH LLL +=  and FH KKK += , .HF DD −=  If Hg  is 
regarded as the share of the home economy in the integrated economy, 
L
rKwL
I
Ig
HHH
H +==        (15) 
where I is the total income of the integrated economy and HI  is the income of the home country. 
For HF III −= , HF gg −= 1 . Using Equations 14 and 15, equations 16 and 17 are obtained. 
)( HK
HH DgLL θ−=         (16) 
)( HL
HH DgKK θ+=        (17) 
Note that 1=+ KL θθ  and ),( KLii =θ is the share of factor i in total income. In the factor price 
equalization area, there is a one-to-one relationship between the factor price and product price, 
and the prices of the goods are given as constant in the integrated economy. Therefore, in 
equilibrium, factor prices would not change, even if the factors were reallocated. If there is no 
change in factor prices, there is no change in aij (i = L, K; j = X, Y). Therefore, aij is regarded as  
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constant once the integrated economy is in equilibrium. Now, rearranging Equations 8 and 9, 
Equations 18 and 19 are obtained.  
KbLbY LXKX −=             (18)  
KbLbS LXKY +−=      (19) 
Here, bij = aij / │A│, i = K, L; j = X, Y), and │A│= aLX aLY (kX - kY) and kX, kY denote capital-labor 
ratio in the production (factor intensity). If X is capital intensive goods, │A│is positive because 
kX > kY.  
 
In the integrated economy, the goods prices and factor prices are identical between the 
two countries and hence aij. Therefore, substituting HL , HK  of Equations 18 and 19 into 
equations 20 and 21, HY and HS  can be solved as follows.  
H
Y
HH DgYY φ−= .        (20) 
H
S
HH DgSS φ+= .        (21) 
Here KbLb LLXKKXY θθφ += , .KbLb LLYKKYS θθφ +=  If we put a superscript F instead of H, 
we obtain the values for the foreign country, FY and FS . Now we know that the production level 
in each country depends on bij (i = L, K; j = X, Y), the relative size of the economy, g, and the 
difference in factor abundance, D. Here, since bij depends on aij, which is given by the 
characteristics of the production function and the utility function, we say that the equilibrium 
production in a country is determined by g and D.  
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4.1.3  Trade Volume and Trade Pattern 
Consider two types of trade; inter-industry trade and intra-industry trade. If sector X produces 
differentiated products, we see a two-way flow of good X, which implies intra-industry trade. 
Note that the home residents consume a proportion Hg  of world output, since preferences in the 
two countries are assumed to be identical. Therefore, if the home country is a capital abundant 
country ( HD  > 0) and X is a capital intensive good, the home country will export X and import X 
and Y. Here, the sum of net exports of X and the imports of Y will give the value of inter-industry 
trade (H). Assuming balance trade, the total value of exports of X is equal to the total value of 
imports of X and Y. From the fact that inter-industry trade will be two times as large as net 
exports of X, Equation 24 is obtained. 
)(2 SPgSPH S
HH
S −=    0≥HD   (22) 
The intra-industry trade (G) is defined as in Equation 25; 
),min(2 IMEXG =      (23) 
where EX and IM are the values of exports and imports, respectively. Under the assumption that X 
is a capital intensive good, if the home country is capital abundant ( HD  > 0), we have net exports 
of X (EX > IM). Thus, intra-industry trade in sector X will be shown as Equation 24.  
F
S
H SPgIMG 22 ==   0≥HD   (24) 
Now total volume of trade is expressed as  
VT = H + G         (25) 
Putting Equations 20 and 21 into Equations 22, 24, 25 the following system of equations 
(under 0≥HD ) is obtained: 
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H
SS DPH )2 φ=     (26) 
)(2)(2 HHSS
HF
S DgPggSPG φ−=   (27) 
)(2)(2 HFSS
HF
S DgPggSPVT φ+=   (28) 
Now, consider an IIT index, B, as the ratio of IIT to total trade 
VT
GB =       (29) 
Substituting Equations 27 and 28 into Equation 31, one obtains 
)()(
)()(
HF
S
HF
HH
S
HF
DgggS
DgggSB φ
φ
+
−=           (30) 
Here, three interesting relationships are found. First, if D = 0, B will be one. This implies that if 
relative factor endowments of the two countries are identical, the IIT index is one, regardless of 
the size of the integrated economy. Second, B increases as the absolute value of D becomes 
smaller, given g. What this means is that given the size of the integrated economy, the IIT index 
will increase as the relative factor endowments of the two countries become more similar. Third, 
the IIT index increases as the sizes of the two economies become similar, given the relative factor 
endowments. 
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4.2   Results of the Empirical Analysis 
To test the hypotheses which are stated in Section 3.4, the following equation is estimated: 
  
,
//
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54321
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ββββββ
βββββ
++
++++++
+++++=
anScandinaviFrench
GermanEnglishNAFTAEUBordersDislance
capDifGNPDifGNPcapAveGNPAveGNPIIT
 
 
where IIT is the bilateral Grubel-Lloyd intra-industry trade index calculated for each pair of 
countries using the weighted average of the 44 three-digit SITC industry grouping in SITC 7.  
AveGNP is the variable indicating the average country (economy) size of any pair of countries, 
AveGNP/cap is the average of the per capita incomes of any pair of countries, DifGNP is the 
difference in country (economy) size between any pair of countries, DifGNP/cap is the difference 
in per capita incomes of any pair of countries, Distance is the distance between any pair of 
countries, Borders is a dummy variable which equals one if there is a common border between 
any pair of countries, EU is a dummy variable which equals one if the two countries participate in 
EU, NAFTA is a dummy variable which equals one if the two countries participate in NAFTA, 
English is a dummy variable which equals one if the two countries use English as a common 
language, German is a dummy variable which equals one if the two countries use German as a 
common language, French is a dummy variable which equals one if the two countries use French 
as a common language, Scandinavian is a dummy variable which equals one if the two countries 
use Scandinavian (Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish) as a common language.  
 
Table 1 reports the results for both regressions; OLS and truncated regression: 
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Table 1 
Estimation of Intra-Industry Trade in a Multi-Country and Multi-Industry Framework 
(OLS and Truncated regression with robust standard errors) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
      OLS              Truncated  
     Dep. Variable: IIT            Dep. Variable: IIT 
 
      Coefficient  Std.  Marginal Coefficient  Std.   Marginal  
      Error   Effect     Error    Effect     
Constant -0.766* 0.451 -0.766 -0.804* 0.485 -0.783 
Average GNP  0.060*** 0.012  0.060  0.077*** 0.017 0.075 
Average 
GNP/capita 
 0.116*** 0.045  0.116  0.118*** 0.045 0.115 
Difference in 
GNP 
-0.192*** 0.037 -0.192 -0.222*** 0.041 -0.217 
Difference in 
GNP/capita 
-0.705*** 0.147 -0.705 -0.793*** 0.177 -0.772 
Distance -0.051*** 0.010 -0.051 -0.062*** 0.011 -0.061 
Borders  0.046* 0.030  0.046  0.051* 0.028 0.031 
EU  0.068*** 0.018  0.068  0.062*** 0.023 0.062 
NAFTA  0.226*** 0.049  0.226  0.191*** 0.051 0.186 
English  0.069** 0.034  0.069  0.077** 0.033 0.075 
German  0.152*** 0.032  0.152  0.148*** 0.032 0.144 
French  0.169*** 0.027  0.169  0.169*** 0.026 0.164 
Scandinavian  0.019 0.041  0.019  0.028 0.044 0.027 
 
         R2 = 0.577              R2 = 0.621 
          N = 258         N = 258   
__________________________________________________________________ 
***Significant at the 1 % level 
  **Significant at the 5 % level 
    *Significant at the 10 % level 
 
The empirical results support the hypotheses put forward in Section 3.4 of the paper. As expected, 
the extent of intra-industry trade is positively correlated with average GNP, average GNP/capita, 
and the existence of a common border; and it is negatively correlated with differences in GNP 
and GNP/capita, and distance. All the variables are highly significant statistically. Moreover, the 
EU and NAFTA dummy variables have the expected positive sign and are highly significant 
statistically. In turn, the regression coefficients of the language dummy variables have a positive 
sign, but their level of statistical significance varies. The German, and French language variables  
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are significant at the 1 % level, the English variable is significant at the 5% level, while the 
Scandinavian language variable is not significant at even the 10 % level. The coefficient of 
determination is 0.577 in the OLS regression and it is 0.621 in the truncated regression. 
 
A further question concerns the relative importance of the individual variables in 
explaining variations in the extent of intra-industry trade. In the following table we report the 
increase of the coefficient of determination resulting from the inclusion of an explanatory 
variable, given the use of all the other variables, in regard to intra-industry trade among all 
countries. 
 
Table 2 
Comparison of the Coefficients of Determination in Different Models 
                         OLS                        Truncated 
       Dep. Variable: IIT       Dep. Variable: IIT 
                ______________________________________ 
                                                                           ______R2       Difference    R2  Difference___ 
 
 
 
 
Model 1: With all variables 0.577 - 0.621 - 
Model 2: Average GNP excluded 0.402 0.175 0.452 0.169 
Model 3: Difference in GNP excluded 0.496 0.081 0.526 0.095 
Model 4: Difference in GNP/capita excluded 0.529 0.048 0.569 0.052 
Model 5: Distance excluded 0.538 0.039 0.586 0.035 
Model 6: EU&NAFTA excluded 0.555 0.022 0.595 0.026 
Model 7: All Languages excluded 0.559 0.018 0.598 0.023 
Model 8: EU excluded 0.560 0.017 0.602 0.019 
Model 9: Average GNP/capita excluded 0.560 0.017 0.603 0.018 
Model 10: English excluded 0.568 0.009 0.608 0.013 
Model 11: German excluded 0.569 0.008 0.609 0.012 
Model 12: NAFTA excluded 0.571 0.006 0.612 0.009 
Model 13: Borders excluded 0.573 0.004 0.613 0.008 
Model 14: French excluded 0.573 0.004 0.615 0.006 
Model 15: Scandinavian excluded 0.576 0.001 0.618 0.003 
Model 16: Industry excluded 0.576 0.001 0.620 0.001 
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The results show that the variables Average GNP and Difference in GNP are the country 
characteristics that contribute the most to the explanatory power of the regression equations, 
followed by Difference in GNP / capita, Distance, EU and NAFTA together, all Languages, EU,  
and Average GNP / capita. By contrast, introduction of the language variables adds little to the 
explanatory power of the equations.  
 
At this point it is appropriate to ask whether the results might differ if industry variables 
such as degree of product differentiation and degree of product standardization were introduced 
into the estimation. This question has been addressed in Balassa and Bauwens (1987) and it is 
shown that differences in the values of the regression coefficients for country characteristics in no 
case attain 2%. At the same time, the statistical significance of the regression coefficients is 
hardly affected and the coefficient of determination changed only slightly from 0.436 to 0.443 by 
adding industry characteristics. 
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5   Conclusions 
 
This paper has tested various hypotheses about the determinants of intra-industry specialization in 
manufactured goods, including common and specific country characteristics. The study covers 24 
countries exporting manufactured goods; calculations have been made for bilateral trade flows 
among all the 24 countries. 
 
The hypotheses put forward in the theoretical literature in regard to common country 
characteristics are generally confirmed by the empirical results. Thus, the extent of intra-industry 
trade is positively correlated with average income levels, average country size, and the existence 
of common borders and it is negatively correlated with income inequality, inequality in country 
size, and distance. All the variables are highly significant. 
 
We also found that the extent of intra-industry trade and participation in the EU, and the 
NAFTA are positively correlated, with all the coefficients being highly significant in the relevant 
equations. Also, the language variables have the expected positive sign whenever they are 
statistically significant, which is the case in most instances.  
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Chapter 5.   Summary and Conclusions 
This dissertation provides three essays on strategic trade policies, intra-industry trade, and income 
convergence. The assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition are often 
violated in the real world. Traditional trade theory based on perfect competition does not 
effectively explain phenomena such as intra-industry trade and the high volume of trade between 
similar countries. Moreover, such models failed to successfully integrate some important policy 
related considerations, such as increasing returns to scale, learning-by-doing, R&D, and inter-
firm strategic rivalries. Effective analysis of these topics requires imperfect competition, which 
together with increasing returns to scale is one of the main characteristics of many of today’s 
industries, especially of those in the industrialized countries. As new theories of imperfectly 
competitive markets have developed, game-theoretic approach of strategic trade policy began to 
emerge in the early 1980’s. 
 
As a strategic trade policy instrument, an export subsidy used by the foreign government 
could be “countervailed” by a domestic import tariff. The interesting point about these 
countervailing effects is that they do not eliminate incentives to use active strategic trade policy, 
and the policy equilibrium normally implies positive subsidies and tariffs. 
 
It may be of a particular interest to integrate the strategic trade policy with the 
hierarchical games in firm theory. Traditional economic theory considers firms as economic 
agents with the single objective of profit maximization. Some have criticized this as being 
simplistic, arguing that real firms may have a different goal. Several theories have suggested that 
large firms are more concerned with maximizing revenues or market shares rather than profits. 
Recent advances in international trade theory emphasize strategic behavior among firms of  
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different countries and its implication for trade policy. With the separation of ownership, 
management, and workers various incentive structures exist within a modern corporation. In order 
to correctly assess the policy intervention in international trade, it is important to understand how 
trade policies affect intra-firm incentives and vice versa. 
 
It is generally argued that a proper analysis of the firm’s objective function should be 
based on the analysis of the owner-manager relationship. A manager’s objective depends on the 
structure of the incentives that his owner sets to motivate him. Owners often index managerial 
compensation to profits, sales, output, quality, and some other variables. Even if the owners want 
to maximize profits, the incentive system they design may imply managerial incentives which are 
different from profit maximization. The principal (firm owner) can distort the incentives of his 
agents (firm managers) in order to affect the outcome of the competition between his agent and 
competing agents. In general, the owner of a firm will adjust his managers’ incentives in such a 
way that it will cause rival agents to change their behavior in favor of that firm. 
 
Chapter 2 is concerned with strategic managerial delegation and its implications for 
international trade policy. Corporate firms, with separation of management and ownership, 
compete in international markets. We ask how trade policy affects the incentive to managers, 
which in turn affects the impact of trade policy on prices and quantities. Our paper combines the 
models of Collie (1994) and Sklivas (1987) in a single integrated analytical framework. The 
integrated model has a modest contribution to the literature by investigating the strategic trade 
policies under duopoly in a multistage game with endogenous timing of trade policy when the 
ownership and the management are separated for each firm.  
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In Chapter 2, trade policy is modeled as a multi-stage game and the timing of trade policy 
decisions is endogenous. At the beginning of the game, stage zero, home and foreign 
governments independently and simultaneously choose whether to set trade policy at stage one or 
at stage two. Then, at the chosen stage, each government sets its trade policy to maximize its 
national welfare. The home government uses an import tariff to shift rent from the foreign firm 
and a production subsidy to correct the domestic distortion due to imperfect competition. The 
foreign government uses an export subsidy to shift profits from the home firm to the foreign firm. 
If, at stage zero, both governments choose to set trade policy at the same stage of the game, then 
the outcome will be a simultaneous-move trade policy game. If the home [foreign] government 
chooses to move at stage one and the foreign [home] government chooses to move at stage two, 
then the outcome will be a Stackelberg game where the home [foreign] government is the 
Stackelberg leader. At stage three the owners will simultaneously write and announce contracts 
with their managers that specify how they will be rewarded. Finally, the managers will 
simultaneously choose their firms’ outputs. The appropriate solution for this multistage game is 
the subgame perfect equilibrium, which is obtained by applying the Nash equilibrium to all the 
stages of the game by the process of backward induction.  
 
The results show that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game, the 
home government sets its tariff and production subsidy at stage one and the foreign government 
sets its export subsidy at stage two. By setting trade policy at stage one the home government 
commits itself to a lower tariff and production subsidy than in the Nash equilibrium of the 
simultaneous-move game, and this encourages the foreign government to use a larger export 
subsidy than in the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game. As a result both countries 
are better off when the home government is the Stackelberg leader than in the simultaneous-move 
game. The home country benefits from a larger foreign export subsidy, and the foreign country  
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gains from facing a lower tariff and production subsidy. The conclusion for trade policy is that 
imperfect competition does not provide an economic rationale for countervailing duties since the 
home country should commit not to use countervailing duties. When compared to those of Collie 
(1994), our results show that home and foreign welfares are higher, home firm’s profits are lower, 
and foreign firm’s profits are higher in each of the three games, i.e. simultaneous-move trade 
policy game, Stackelberg game when the home government is the Stackelberg leader, and 
Stackelberg game when the foreign government is the Stackelberg leader. 
 
Chapter 3 analyzes the relationship between international trade and income convergence 
among countries by focusing on groups of countries comprising major trade partners. The subject 
of convergence of economic growth is one of the most important issues in modern economics. In 
a world in which countries exchange goods, factors, and ideas; international linkages are what 
drive any convergence process. Free trade in goods can equalize factor prices across countries 
according to the factor-price-equalization theorem; international flows of factors can lead to 
convergence of endowments and factor prices; and international flows of technology can cause 
convergence of factor prices as well. 
 
 In neoclassical growth models a country’s per capita growth rate tends to be inversely 
related to its starting level of per capita income. In particular, if countries are similar with respect 
to structural parameters for preferences and technology, then poor countries tend to grow faster 
than rich countries. That is, it is a prediction of neoclassical economic growth theory that 
differences in per capita income across different economies will tend to decrease or disappear 
over time. This is broadly referred to as the convergence hypothesis.  
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Though there is evidence of income convergence among some of the wealthy countries 
(Baumol, 1986; Baumol et al., 1989), it is not obvious why some subsets of these countries 
exhibit greater convergence than others, while other subsets of countries display no convergence 
tendencies at all. Chapter 3 analyzes this issue from the perspective of trade’s contribution to the 
process. It examines the relationship between international trade and income convergence among 
countries by focusing on groups of countries forming major trade partners.  
 
The analysis includes the 1971-2002 income and trade data of 24 developed countries42 
with per capita incomes of $10, 000 or higher in 2002. The first step is to determine each 
country’s primary trade partners and to create trade groups using the intra-industry trade shares of 
the total trade between countries. Having formed the trade groups, the behavior of each group’s 
income differentials over time is examined for a significant evidence of convergence within them. 
The results show that majority of these intra-industry trade-based groups exhibit significant 
convergence. When the trade groups are formed according to the total trade between the countries 
rather than intra-industry trade, we see a significant decrease in the number of the groups which 
exhibit income convergence.  
 
Then, the robustness and sensitivity of the results are examined from a number of 
different perspectives. To test whether any random grouping of these same countries might 
produce similar results, the 24 source countries are grouped into their many different possible 
subgroups and their convergence coefficients are estimated. To test whether convergence within 
groups might be towards one country that is common to most of the groups, the major trade 
partner of the countries is removed from each of the groups, the new convergence coefficients are  
                                                 
 
42 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States of America. 
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estimated, and the results are compared. To test whether the tendency towards convergence is 
considerably stronger when the basis for constructing groups is trade rather than proximity or 
common language, the countries are regrouped to reflect geographical closeness or common 
languages; and the degree of convergence within each of these groups are then compared to the 
results of the trade-based groups.  
 
The results show that significant income convergence is not a common outcome among 
countries when they are grouped randomly instead of grouping them according to their trade 
partners; the convergence within groups is not towards one country that is common to most of the 
groups, but is instead an outcome that tends to be relatively robust to the exclusion of the major 
trade partners that are members in most of the groups; and the tendency towards convergence 
appears to be considerably stronger when the basis for constructing groups is trade rather than 
proximity or common language. 
 
Chapter 4 provides recent evidence on determinants of the bilateral intra-industry trade in 
a multi-country & multi-industry framework. Bilateral trade data of the year 2002 at three-digit 
SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) industry groups is used for 24 developed 
countries, namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and USA.  
 
First, a theoretical summary of a two-country model based on product differentiation and 
economies of scale is provided, following Helpman (1981) and Helpman and Krugman (1985). 
Then, using this model, the determinants of bilateral intra-industry trade are analyzed in the trade 
of each country with every other country in each industry category. The hypotheses that are tested  
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in this study investigate the effect of the following country characteristics on the bilateral intra-
industry trade: average country size, average per capita income, country size difference, per 
capita income difference, distance, common border, participation in economic integration 
systems, and common language. 
 
Chapter 4 follows closely the studies of Helpman (1981), Helpman and Krugman (1985, 
ch.7), and Kim and Oh (2001). This research contributes to the existing literature of intra-industry 
trade in several ways. This study employs very recent trade data, namely data of 2002. Second, 
the data in the analysis is wide-ranging43; 24 developed countries are included. Third, this study 
concentrates on testing country characteristics while most empirical studies44 of intra-industry 
trade have concentrated on testing industry characteristics such as economies of scale and product 
differentiation. Fourth, the empirical analysis covers a wide variety of country characteristics 
together, which are developed separately in the literature, i.e., average country size, average per 
capita income, country size difference, per capita income difference, distance, common border, 
participation in economic integration systems, and common language. 
 
The empirical results show that the extent of intra-industry trade is positively correlated 
with average GNP, average GNP/capita, and the existence of a common border; and it is 
negatively correlated with differences in GNP and GNP/capita, and distance. All the variables are 
highly significant statistically. The EU and NAFTA dummy variables have the expected positive 
sign and are highly significant statistically. The regression coefficients of the language dummy  
                                                 
 
43 The total number of observations is expected to be 12, 144 (= 24C2 (= 276) country combinations x 44 
SITC categories) but in considerable amount of cases (18 %) neither exports nor imports exist in bilateral 
trade flows. Then the index of intra-industry trade is not defined and these observations are excluded from 
the analysis. 
44 Clark (1993), Lundberg (1992), Ray (1991), Hamilton and Kniest (1991), Marvel and Ray (1987), 
Balassa (1986), Greenaway and Milner (1984). 
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variables have a positive sign, but their level of statistical significance varies. Moreover, the 
results show that the variables Average GNP and Difference in GNP are the country 
characteristics that contribute the most to the explanatory power of the regression equations.  
 
 
